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INTERIM ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS
AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
GREGORY C. SISKI

With increasingfrequency, parties in litigation against the federal
government petition courts for awards of attorney'sfees at an interim

stage of the proceedings. However, the government historicallyhas been

entitled to appellate review before being required to pay any monetary
award. In this Article, Mr. Sisk discusses several recent decisions
awarding interimfees against the government as well as appropriations
and fee-shifting statutes that govern such awards. By statute, Congress
has established a Judgment Fund for payment of monetary awards
against the United States only afterfinaljudgment not subject to further
review. Some statutes also allow litigants to collect attorney's fees
awardsfrom the coffers of individualfederal agencies. The Article concludes that contested interimfee awards are not legallypayablefrom the
Judgment Fund before the government has exhausted its optionsfor appellate review. Interim awards are permissible, however, when courts
order them pursuant to statutes authorizingpayment from individual
agencies. Finally, the Article outlines strict standardsfor awarding interim attorney'sfees against the government. Although these standards
protect the governmentfrom premature charges upon the public Treasury, they permit interim awards when necessary to provide assistance to
clearly prevailing litigants suffering financialhardship.
With the proliferation of statutes waiving the sovereign immunity of the
federal government for awards of attorney's fees' and the corresponding explot Associate, Karr Tuttle Campbell, Seattle, Washington; B.A., Montana State University,
1981; J.D., University of Washington, 1984. As a former attorney with the Appellate Staff, Civil
Division of the United States Department of Justice, the author participated in cases concerning
interim attorney's fee awards against the federal government, including cases discussed in this Article. However, the views expressed herein are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Department of Justice. The author would like to thank William Kanter, Michael Singer, Robert
Rasmussen, Steve Murphy, Thomas Bondy, and Deborah Kant at the Department of Justice; Robert
Centola and Oliver Easterwood at the General Accounting Office; and Professor William Stoebuck
of the University of Washington School of Law for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
Article.
1. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982); Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(B) (1982); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1982); Equal
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. V 1987); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (1982). For a comprehensive
survey of attorney's fees statutes waiving the sovereign immunity of the federal government, see J.
BENNETT, WINNING ATTORNEY'S FEES FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (1988).
The availability of attorney's fees against the federal government, on an interim basis or otherwise, for violation of court rules is beyond the scope of this Article. For a comprehensive treatment
of this topic, see 1 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES § 9.03[3], at 9-48
to 9-57 (1989) (interim attorney's fees under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Congress has
expressly waived the sovereign immunity of the government for awards of fees as sanctions for fail-

ure to cooperate in discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Equal Access to Justice
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 205(a), 94 Stat. 2325, 2330 (1980). A few courts have held that sanctions

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

sion of attorney's fees litigation, federal courts are being called upon with in-

creasing frequency to consider whether the United States and its agencies may
be held liable for fees on an interim or interlocutory basis.2 Even against private

3
defendants, awards of interim attorney's fees remain relatively uncommon.

Courts have been especially reluctant to award fees against the federal government and to charge the public Treasury for such an award before the litigation is
complete and the plaintiff's entitlement to payment is certain. But a few courts

recently have published decisions allowing interim fees against the government,
so this trickle could become a stream.

The advantage of an interim award of attorney's fees to parties in litigation
with the government, particularly when the litigation has become protracted, is

unmistakable. The federal government, however, traditionally has been held immune from any requirement that an award or judgment for fees or damages be
paid prior to appellate review. In an era of fiscal restraint, the government's
ability to resist interim awards and to postpone payment of awards until its liability has been confirmed on appeal takes on added importance.
This conflict of interest between private litigants, eager to obtain an imme-

diate infusion of cash resources as litigation with the government drags on, and
the government, desiring to avoid payments until it has exercised its right to
appellate review, has played itself out in several recent cases. 4 A few federal
courts, sympathetic to the private litigant pleading hardship, have permitted interim fee awards against the United States and have stretched statutes waiving
the sovereign immunity of the government to cover this exceptional remedy. 5
Indeed, some courts have been willing to overlook or avoid-one might say
"evade"-express statutory provisions precluding payments of awards before
6
the government has exhausted its rights to appellate review.
for filing frivolous or improper pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I I may be imposed
upon the government. See, e.g., United States v. Gavilan Joint Community College Dist., 849 F.2d
1246, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1988) (dictum); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 670-72 (10th Cir. 1988)
(Equal Access to Justice Act waives sovereign immunity of the United States for rule 11 sanctions).
2. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988) (approving interim fee
award under Freedom of Information Act); Haitian Refugee Center v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489 (11 th
Cir.), as modified on reh'g, 804 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (upholding interim fee
award under Equal Access to Justice Act); Allen v. Department of Defense, 713 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C.
1989) (granting interim fee award under Freedom of Information Act); Brown v. Marsh, 707 F.
Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1989) (granting interim fee award under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
McKenzie v. Kennickell, 669 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1987) (same); Jurgens v. EEOC, 660 F. Supp.
1097 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (same); Powell v. Department of Justice, 569 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(granting interim fee award under the Freedom of Information Act).
3. Green, From Here to Attorney's Fees: Certainty, Efficiency, and Fairnessin the Journey to
the Appellate Courts, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 207, 269 n.332 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988); Allen v. Department of
Defense, 713 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1989); Brown v. Marsh, 707 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1989); McKenzie
v. Kennickell, 669 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1987); Jurgens v. EEOC, 660 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Tex.
1987); Powell v. Department of Justice, 569 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
5. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988); Allen v. Department of
Defense, 713 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1989); Brown v. Marsh, 707 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1989); McKenzie
v. Kennickell, 669 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1987); Jurgens v. EEOC, 660 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Tex.
1987); Powell v. Department of Justice, 569 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
6. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988); Allen v. Department of
Defense, 713 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1989); McKenzie v. Kennickell, 669 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1987);
Jurgens v. EEOC, 660 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
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In view of the well-established principle that courts must construe waivers
of sovereign immunity strictly in favor of the government, 7 the willingness of
these courts to view attorney's fee statutes expansively is questionable. When
the attorney's fee award is payable from the United States' permanent "Judgment Fund, ' 8 rather than from agency funds, express statutory limitations
plainly bar payment of nonfinal interim attorney's fee awards. 9 When an attorney's fee award is properly payable from separate agency funds, however, rather
than directly from the public Treasury, there is a stronger basis for inferring the
authority to award interim fees. When legally available, such awards still should
be reserved for exceptional circumstances.
Even when statutes or principles of sovereign immunity do not bar interim
fee awards, a strong presumption disfavoring interim awards against the government should prevail. Petitions for awards of attorney's fees on an interlocutory
basis ask the court to make an early judgment about whether the petitioning
party has achieved sufficient success in the ongoing litigation to be fairly regarded as actually having prevailed, even though final judgment has not yet been
rendered. If a court grants interim fees prematurely, the government could end
up subsidizing the litigation of the ultimately losing party. This is a particular
concern if the party is impecunious and thus unlikely to be able to repay the
award later. Accordingly, interim awards against the government are justified
only when the fee applicant has definitively prevailed on the merits of an important claim in the case and is suffering such substantial hardship from the protracted nature of the proceedings that the litigation will have to be abandoned
absent an immediate award of fees.
This Article explores the question whether a court may order interim
awards of attorney's fees against the federal government in the significantly different contexts of statutes that make fee awards payable by the United States
from the so-called Judgment Fund,10 and other statutes that provide for payment of fee awards from agency funds. 1 The Article then suggests fairly strict

standards to guide court discretion in deciding whether particular circumstances
warrant an interim award of fees against the government. 12 The overriding
theme of this Article is that courts should move cautiously unless and until Con-

gress returns to this area of the law and establishes explicit statutory standards
7. Waivers of sovereign immunity are construed strictly and narrowly. Library of Congress v.
Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983). In order
for claims to be brought against and judgments to be paid by the United States, there must be an
explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160-61 (1981); United
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). Because Congress alone may waive the sovereign immunity of the United States, the terms of such waivers define the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain
an action against the government. Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983); Testan, 424
U.S. at 399.
8. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982). For a discussion of the Judgment Fund, a permanent appropriation established by Congress for payment ofjudgments against the United States, see infra notes 1429 and accompanying text.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (1982).
10. See infra notes 14-131 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 132-231 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 232-310 and accompanying text.
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for interim attorney's fees. Courts must remember that only Congress
has the
13
constitutional power to authorize disbursements from public funds.
I.

A.

AWARDS OF INTERIM FEES PAYABLE BY THE UNITED STATES

The Judgment Fund

Prior to 1956,14 judgments awarded against the United States generally
could not be paid until Congress enacted specific appropriations legislation for
that purpose. 15 As a consequence, payments of money judgments were frequently long delayed. t 6 With the enactment of the Judgment Fund statutes, 31
U.S.C. § 130417 and 28 U.S.C. § 2414,18 Congress established a procedure to
permit timely payment of money awards after the judgment became final upon
19
the exhaustion of appellate rights.

Subsection 1304(a) of Title 31, United States Code, which establishes the
Judgment Fund, provides a general waiver of immunity for payment of money
judgments and awards rendered against the United States and its agencies, when
"payment is not otherwise provided for" by another statute. 20 The Judgment
Fund is a permanent and continuing appropriation, separate and distinct from
any agency operating appropriations. It provides the sole source for payment of
13. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
14. In 1956, Congress established the permanent appropriation known as the "Judgment
Fund." Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 814, 70 Stat. 678, 694 (codified at 31

U.S.C. § 1304 (1982)).
15. See S. REP. No. 733, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2439, 2439, 2441; In re S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. East Harlem Pilot Block-Payment of Judgment, 62 Comp. Gen. 12, 16 (1982).
Actually, on rare occasions, Congress refused to appropriate funds for a particular judgment
"leaving the judgment creditor with a valid entitlement against the United States but no funds legally available to satisfy it." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 12-3 (1st ed. 1982) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW] (the General Accounting Office is currently preparing a second
edition of this manual); see, e.g., Act of February 2, 1932, Pub. L. No. 5, 47 Stat. 15, 28 (expressly
excepting certain judgments from the appropriation for payment of Court of Claims judgments); see
also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570 (1962) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J., announcing
judgment of the Court) (citing a study finding only 15 instances in 70-year period in which Congress
had refused to appropriate funds for a judgment).
16. See S. REP. No. 733, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., reprintedin 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2439, 2439, 2441; S.S. Silberblatt, Inc., 62 Comp. Gen. at 16.
17. Act of July 27, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-814, §§ 1301-1302, 70 Stat. 678, 694-95 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982)).
18. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, §§ 2414, 62 Stat. 869, 974 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (1982)).
19. As originally enacted, the Judgment Fund was only available for the payment ofjudgments
not in excess of $100,000. Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 814, 70 Stat. 678,
694 (originally codified at 31 U.S.C. § 724a (1976)) (codified as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982));
see PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 15, at 12-4 to 12-5. The statute

was amended to eliminate any ceiling on payments in 1977. Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, 91 Stat. 61, 96 (1977) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982)).
20. Subsection 1304(a) reads in pertinent part:
Necessary amounts are appropriated to pay final judgments, awards, compromise settlements, and interest and costs specified in the judgments or otherwise authorized by law
when(1) payment is not otherwise provided for;
(2) payment is certified by the Comptroller General; and
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court awards and judgments against the United States and its agencies, except
when another statute designates a different payment source that is legally available to pay judgments. 2 1 Because appropriations of agency funds rarely provide
for use of such funds in the payment of judgments, as a general rule, awards and
22
judgments are payable only from the Judgment Fund.
Subsection 1304(a) authorizes payment from the Judgment Fund only on
the terms and conditions set forth in that provision. Section 2414 of Title 28,
United States Code, referred to in Subsection 1304(a)(3)(A), establishes one of
the primary conditions on payments from the Judgment Fund. 23 Section 2414
provides that "payment offinaljudgments rendered by a district court... shall
be made on settlement by the General Accounting Office." 24 The statute deems
a judgment to be final "[w]henever the Attorney General determines that no
(3) the judgment, award, or settlement is payable
(A) under section 2414 ...

of title 28

31 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1982).
21. Subsection 1304(a)(1) excepts an award or judgment from the Judgment Fund as the sole
source of payment only if "payment is ... otherwise provided for." Id. § 1304(a)(1) (emphasis
added). The explicit use of the term "payment" makes clear that the subsection refers to other
statutes that provide for actual "payment" of awards or judgments from certain appropriations, and
not merely to substantive waivers of sovereign immunity which make the government liable for
monetary awards orjudgments. If the mere creation by statute of substantive liability on the federal
government's part served also to except judgments under such a statute from the finality requirement
of the Judgment Fund statutes, the Judgment Fund statutes obviously would be rendered nugatory.
In fact, it is the rare statute that both waives the immunity of the federal government against monetary liability and also provides for the actual payment of money judgments from designated appropriations. For discussion of one of those rare statutes, see infra notes 165-231 and accompanying
text. Subsection 1304(a)(1) is thus a codification of the longstanding rule that, in the absence of a
specific statutory provision for payment of judgments, judgments against the government could not
be paid from agency appropriations. 34 Comp. Gen. 221, 224 (1954); 15 Comp. Gen. 933, 934-35
(1936).
22. If the named defendant in a lawsuit is a federal agency or federal officer rather than the
United States, this fact does not determine whether an attorney's fee award is charged against the
United States Treasury (i.e., payable from the Judgment Fund) or against agency funds. "The nature of the judgment and not the caption of the case is the controlling factor" for determining
whether an award or judgment is to be paid from the Judgment Fund. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 15, at 12-8. For example, under both the Freedom of Information Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the named defendant invariably is an agency
or the head of an agency. The attorney's fees provisions in both statutes, however, provide for
payment of the award by the United States. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982) (Freedom of Information
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982) (Title VII); see infra notes 44-127 and accompanying text for
discussion of these two fee-shifting statutes. Likewise, in environmental litigation against federal
agencies, including citizen suits to compel the Environmental Protection Agency to take certain
action, awards of attorney's fees are payable from the Judgment Fund, not from agency funds.
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supranote 15, at 12-17 (Comptroller General has
ruled that fees awarded against the Environmental Protection Agency in citizen suits under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987), are payable from
the Judgment Fund).
23. Section 2414 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Except as provided by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, payment of final judgments
rendered by a district court or the Court of International Trade against the United States
shall be made on settlements by the General Accounting Office ....
Whenever the Attorney General determines that no appeal shall be taken from a judgment or that no further review will be sought from a decision affirming the same, he shall
so certify and the judgment shall be deemed final.
28 U.S.C. § 2414 (1982).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
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appeal shall be taken from a judgment or that no further review will be sought

from a decision affirming the same." 25 In addition, Subsection 1304(a)(2) re-

quires that the Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office certify the

award for payment. The Comptroller General may not make this certification
properly until the underlying judgment is final and no longer subject to modifi-

cation upon appeal. In an official ruling, the Comptroller General 26 has
explained:
In order for a judgment to be paid from the permanent appropriation,
it must be certified by the Comptroller General to the Treasury Department for payment. This cannot be done until we have been furpayment, with the assurance that
nished the amount to be certified for 27
it is not subject to further litigation.
In sum, Sections 1304 and 2414 permit payment of a monetary award
against the United States only after the Attorney General has notified the Comptroller General that the government has exhausted the appeal process or does
not contemplate further appeal 28 and the Comptroller General has certified the
25. Id.; see also 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorney General § 31, at 40 & n.9 (1980) (whenever the Attorney General has determined not to take an appeal or seek further review, a judgment is deemed final
under Section 2414); cf. McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1983) (for purposes of
46 U.S.C. § 784 (1982), defining the circumstances under which the United States will pay admiralty
claims, the term "final judgment" "must mean final after all appeals, for one cannot imagine the
government being willing to pay before then").
Section 2517 of Title 28 establishes a similar finality requirement for the payment of judgments
by the United States Claims Court from the Judgment Fund. 28 U.S.C. § 2517 (1982). Section 2517
does not contain the same language providing for certification by the Attorney General that no
further review of the judgment will be sought. This section does, however, expressly limit payment
to "every final judgment," which has been understood to mean final after all appeals in the same
manner as Section 2414. Id. (emphasis added); cf. McDonald, 726 F.2d at 313.
26. Because the Comptroller General is designated by the statute to certify payment to the
Treasury, the published opinions of the Comptroller General construing his certification powers are
entitled to the same deference given to an administrative agency's regulations implementing a statute. Accordingly, judicial review is narrow and deferential. Young v. Community Nutrition Inst.,
476 U.S. 974, 980-81 (1986). Courts must defer to the Comptroller General's opinion if it "is based
on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text for discussion of the deference owed to the Comptroller General's opinions on payment of attorney's fee
awards.
27. In re Payment of Judgments Under Back Pay Act and Title VII of Civil Rights Act, 58
Comp. Gen. 311, 314 (1979) (citations omitted); see also In re Attorney Fees-Judicial Awards
Under Equal Access to Justice Act, 63 Comp. Gen. 260 (1984) (permanent indefinite appropriation
for judgments under 31 U.S.C. § 1304 is available to pay attorney's fees awarded under subsection
(b) of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Supp. V 1987), under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982), and under the Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982), provided, inter alia, the award is final). See generally PRINCIPLES Or
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 15, at 12-25 to 12-28 (discussing finality requirement;
the forthcoming second edition of this manual will discuss the finality requirement at section D of
chapter 13).
28. Before the Judgment Fund was created to pay awards and judgments against the United
States, Congress traditionally included specific finality language in its appropriations for the payment of judgments. See, e.g., Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, 91 Stat,
61, 96 (1977) ("no judgment herein appropriated for shall be paid until it shall become final and
conclusive against the United States by failure of the parties to appeal or otherwise"); Act of February 2, 1932, Pub. L. No. 5, 47 Stat. 15, 28 ("None of the judgments contained under this caption
shall be paid until the right of appeal shall have expired except such as have become final and
conclusive against the United States by failure of the parties to appeal or otherwise."); Act of March
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,
award's finality.2 9
The manifest purpose of these statutes is to protect the public Treasury.
Congress has determined that the United States ought not to pay unreviewed
awards by district courts when the United States contemplates appellate action,
because a successful appeal will render such payments unjustified. 30 Moreover,
the finality requirement protects the United States from expending additional

resources to recoup monies that a court might improperly direct the government
to pay at an interlocutory stage.
Because courts have understood almost intuitively that they may not compel the United States to make payment on money judgments until litigation is
concluded, few courts have found occasion to address the limitations of Sections

1304 and 2414. However, in Barnes v. United States,3 1 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized the statutes' requirement that the
litigation reach final judgment before any monetary judgment can be paid. In

that case, the government appealed from a judgment in excess of $1.5 million

entered in favor of plaintiff, contesting its liability as to approximately $665,000
in damages. 32 Although the government conceded its liability for $900,000 in
damages, plaintiff was unable to obtain any payment of this sum because of the

finality requirement of Section 2414.33 In order to avoid a lengthy delay in the
payment of this uncontested portion of the judgment, the Third Circuit granted
plaintiff's motion for partial summary affirmance of the undisputed portion of
damages. 34 In that way, the court could enter final judgment as to the undis35
puted amount and satisfy Section 2414.
4, 1925, Pub. L. No. 631, 43 Stat. 1313, 1347 ("None of thejudgments contained herein shall be paid
until the right of appeal shall have expired.").
29. J. STEADMAN, D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 115 (1983) ("The GAO is not authorized to certify a judgment until it is final, that is, when
the appellate process is completed."); see also Keasler v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 825, 836 (E.D.
Ark. 1984) (for purposes of Sections 2414 and 1-304, final judgment "does not occur until the appellate court has acted"), aff'd, 766 F.2d 1227, 1230 (8th Cir. 1985); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States, 240 F.2d 863, 864 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (Danaher, J., concurring) (decision was final
under 28 U.S.C. § 2414 because the Attorney General had certified no appeal would be taken), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 825 (1957).
30. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 15, at 12-25 ("the purpose of
the finality requirement is to protect the Government 'against loss by premature payment of a judgment which might later through appeal be amended or reversed' ") (citing Comp. Gen. Op. No. B129227, unpublished decision (Dec. 22, 1960)). The same principle is reflected in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 62(e), which provides for an automatic stay of monetary awards against the United
States and its officers and agencies when an appeal is noted. This rule protects the government from
making an immediate payment of any judgment until it has been reviewed on appeal.
31. 678 F,2d 10, 11 (3d Cir. 1982).
32. Id. at 11.
33, Id.
34. Id. at 11-13.
35. Id. at 11. In Parker v. Lewis, 670 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court entered an order to
the same effect, although the court did not mention the express finality limitations of the Judgment
Fund statutes. In Parker,the government had taken an appeal challenging the amount of an award
of attorney's fees in a Title VII employment discrimination suit, thereby obtaining a stay as to payment of the entire award under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d). Id. at 250 & n. 1. To permit
immediate payment of the uncontested amount of the award, the court entered summary affirmance
as to that amount. Id. at 249-50.
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The Judgment Fund Finality Requirement And Interim Fees

Attorney's fees generally cannot be paid on an interim basis because payments from the Judgment Fund may not be made until an award or judgment is
final. Sections 1304 and 2414 prohibit the General Accounting Office from settling an award and certifying payment to the Treasury until the award is no
longer subject to appellate review.3 6 Interim fee awards by their very nature will
be subject to eventual appellate review, usually after final judgment in the district court; therefore, the strictures of Sections 1304 and 2414 cannot be satisfied. Moreover, the validity of an attorney's fee award is almost invariably
contingent upon the validity of the underlying court ruling on the merits of the
primary issues in the case. Until the merits of the case have been finally resolved
as well-that is, until the winner's victory has been vindicated on appeal or the
time for an appeal on the merits has passed-the entitlement of any litigant to
fees necessarily remains uncertain. Thus, a fee award cannot be said to be final
within the meaiing of the Judgment Fund statutes until there has been an opportunity for appeal on both the underlying merits and the award itself. Because
there is no statutory authority permitting the payment of a monetary award that
the United States intends to appeal, a judicial order requiring immediate payment of such an award would be unlawful.
Of course, in a literal sense, the Judgment Fund finality requirement does
not actually bar an "award" of interim fees; it simply prevents the payment of
any such award. An interim fee award is of little practical use, however, if it
cannot be paid until the conclusion of the litigation. Thus, as a result of the
limitations on payment from the Judgment Fund, interim fee awards are not
permissible in the usual case.
One important exception does exist, although it applies only when an award
of fees is not disputed. A district court may entertain an application for interim
fees and then allow the United States to decide whether it contests the request.
If the United States is willing to concede the legitimacy of an interim award, and
the Attorney General is willing to certify that the government will not seek appellate review of such an award in the future, the award can properly be paid
from the Judgment Fund. The finality limitation in Sections 1304 and 2414
turns on the government's desire to seek eventual appellate review, not on the
37
actual stage of the litigation.
As an example, in Young v. Pierce,38 in which plaintiff had sought an award
of fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b),3 9 the district court correctly held that "while
36. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.

37. See generally Comp. Gen. Op. No. B-208999 (Sept. 13, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
ComGen file) (an interim attorney's fee award may be paid, regardless of the status of the underlying
litigation, provided the fee award itself is "final" because the Attorney General has determined not
to appeal the award).
38. 822 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1987).

39. Subsection 2412(b) is part of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(b) (Supp. V 1987). Most awards under the EAJA are made pursuant to Subsection 2412(d),
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (Supp. V 1987), and are paid out of agency funds. Subsection 2412(b) awards

are paid from the Judgment Fund, unless the award is made for reasons of bad faith. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(c) (1982). See infra notes 139-64 and accompanying text.
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the disbursement statute [31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)] does prevent payment of fees
prior to the entry of final judgment, it does not define final judgment as the
resolution of all issues in a civil action." 4 Because the court in that case had

certified the fee award as a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b), allowing an immediate appeal, and because the still pending remedy phase
of the litigation would not affect the award's validity, 4 1 the finality requirement
of Sections 1304 and 2414 was satisfied. Moreover, the government in Young
had expressly conceded that an attorney's fee award was appropriate and thus
did not raise any challenge to the propriety of such an award on appeal.4 2
Cases like Young, although not rare, are still not typical. In the ordinary
case, the distinction between finality within the meaning of the Judgment Fund
statutes and final judgment in the district court followed by affirmance in the
court of appeals may be merely theoretical. Because an appeal usually will lie
only from a final judgment in the district court,4 3 and the government is unlikely
to concede interim liability in the ordinary case, the finality requirement in the
Judgment Fund statutes is difficult to satisfy when district court litigation is still
in an interlocutory posture. In the ordinary case, the conditions on payment
from the Judgment Fund will be met only after the litigation in the district court
has been concluded and the government has either taken an unsuccessful appeal
or has determined not to seek appellate review.
C. Interim Fee Awards Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Three federal district courts have permitted interim attorney's fee awards
against the United States in litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,44 payable from the Judgment Fund, notwithstanding the express finality
requirement of Sections 1304 and 2414. In Brown v. Marsh,45 McKenzie v. Kennickell,46 and Jurgens v. EEOC,4 7 these courts ruled that the Title VII attorney's
fee provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) 4 -although it contains neither language
concerning the actual payment of fee awards 49 nor any statement that fees are
available before final judgment-supersedes the express prohibition in Section
2414 against the payment by the United States of nonfinal money judgments.
These three courts rested their decisions on the language in Subsection
2000e-5(k), which states that the United States bears the same liability as a "pri40. Young, 822 F.2d at 1377 (describing district court ruling).
41. Id.
42. Id. The government did, however, appeal the method of calculation of the attorney's fee

award. Id.
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). This Article suggests, however, that interlocutory appeals of
interim fee awards should be more readily available. See infra notes 283-310 and accompanying text.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
45. 707 F. Supp. 21, 23 (D.D.C. 1989).
46. 669 F. Supp. 529, 536 (D.D.C. 1987).
47. 660 F. Supp. 1097, 1103 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
49. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (an award is excepted from the Judgment Fund
and the attendant finality requirement only when made under a statute that expressly provides for
payment of the award from another appropriation).
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vate person" for the purposes of awarding attorney's fees. 50 Because an award
of interim attorney's fees would be available against a private party under Title
VII, 5 1 these courts concluded that Subsection 2000e-5(k) mandates that such an
award must be available against the federal government as well. 52 To the extent
that Sections 1304 and 2414 conflicted with that conclusion, these courts held
53
that the more specific Title VII statute prevailed.

These three decisions are almost certainly wrong. Although one court ac54
knowledged that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed,
all three nevertheless broadly read the private person provision in Subsection
2000e-5(k) as a waiver of the government's historical immunity from being required to pay awards before it exhausts its rights to appeal. Under the
mandatory strict construction, the courts should have read the private person
language as simply describing the nature of the relief available against the government-that is, describing the manner in which entitlement to attorney's fees
is to be determined-rather than affecting the timing or the payment of such
awards.
The general rule that statutes are to be construed to avoid conflict if possible also compels this narrower reading. These three courts assumed that the
Title VII fees provision conflicts with Sections 1304 and 2414. To the contrary,
the Title VII statute simply provides for a certain type of relief-awards of attorney's fees-and the Judgment Fund statutes serve the separate and compatible
purpose of establishing the manner and timing of payment of awards. 55
In addition, these three decisions do not square with the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Library of Congressv. Shaw56 that the federal government is not liable for an award of interest upon an attorney's fee award under
Title VII. 57 The plaintiff in Shaw, like the plaintiffs in Brown, McKenzie, and
50. Subsection 2000e-5(k) provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for
costs the same as a private person.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
51. Applying the same principles that generally make interim awards permissible against private parties, courts have had little difficulty concluding that private parties may be liable under
appropriate circumstances for interim awards of attorney's fees under Title VII. See, e.g., James v.
Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034
(1978); Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp.-Toledo Machining Plant, 445 F. Supp. 559, 560 (N.D. Ohio
1977). Of course, in such circumstances, no principles of sovereign immunity are involved, nor do
statutes preclude payment by private parties of nonfinal awards or judgments.
52. Brown, 707 F. Supp. at 23; McKenzie, 669 F. Supp. at 534; Jurgens, 660 F. Supp. at 10991100.
53. Brown, 707 F. Supp. at 23; McKenzie, 669 F. Supp. at 534; Jurgens, 660 F. Supp. at 1102.
54. Jurgens, 660 F. Supp. at 1101 (agreeing that waivers of sovereign immunity are "strictly
construed").
55. For discussion of the similar suggestion that the attorney's fee provision in the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982), conflicts with and supersedes the Judgment Fund
statutes, see infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
56. 478 U.S. 310 (1986).
57. Id. at 314 ("In the absence of express congressional consent to the award of interest sepa-

rate from a general waiver of immunity to suit, the United States is immune from an interest
award.").
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Jurgens, relied on a broad reading of the private person language in Subsection

2000e-5(k).5 8 The Supreme Court's decision in Shaw rested in part on the conclusion that interest is a separate element of damages rather than a part of the
fees and costs authorized by Subsection 2000e-5(k).5 9 The Court, however, also
justified its ruling by observing that "[o]ther statutes placing the United States in

the same position as a private party also have been read narrowly to preserve
certain immunities that the United States has enjoyed historically."' 60 One of

those historical and central immunities is the immunity from having to pay
money awards before final judgment, as preserved in Sections 1304 and 2414.

The facts of both the McKenzie and Jurgens cases indicate that the fee

awards there likely satisfied--or nearly satisfied-the finality requirement of the
Judgment Fund statutes. Both cases dealt with largely undisputed claims that
substantially, if not technically, could be considered final for purposes of Sec-

tions 1304 and 2414. In Jurgens, ninety-two percent of the Title VII claimants
had already accepted the government's offers of settlement, thereby finalizing
those claims. 61 In addition, the government had "certified" that the court's fee
award was "warranted." 62 In McKenzie, the government had stipulated to a

final order resolving all substantive issues and then openly conceded that an
attorney's fee award was warranted. 63 Indeed, the government reported to the
district court that the plaintiffs were entitled to $200,000 as an irreducible minimum amount.64 Moreover, the McKenzie court recognized that if the govern58. Id. at 317-19.
59. Id. at 321. These three district courts distinguished the Shaw decision on this basis. Brown,
707 F. Supp. at 23; McKenzie, 669 F. Supp. at 535; Jurgens, 660 F. Supp. at 1102. In a very recent
decision, the Supreme Court appeared to retreat somewhat from this interest-as-damages rationale
for Shaw, indicating that the primary basis for the Shaw ruling was the special and historical immunity of the federal government from liability for interest. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 S.Ct. 2463,
2468 n.3 (1989).
60. Shaw, 478 U.S. at 319-20.
61. Jurgens, 660 F. Supp. at 1099, 1103 n.5.
62. Id. at 1099. Moreover, following the district court's decision in Jurgens, the Department of
Justice decided against appeal to the Fifth Circuit and certified that decision to the General Accounting Office, thereby permitting immediate payment in full accordance with Sections 1304 and
2414. The Solicitor General officially determined against an appeal on February 9, 1987, thereby
allowing proper payment of the award in accordance with the district court's order requiring payment by February 10, 1987. Id. at 1103. The Solicitor General's determination against appeal in
Jurgens is a matter of record at the Department of Justice.
63. McKenzie, 669 F. Supp. at 530.
64. Id. at 531. Thus, the McKenzie court's interim award based on the undisputed amount of
$200,000 is very similar to the separate judgment issued by the Third Circuit in Barnes v. United
States, 678 F.2d 10, 13 (3d Cir. 1982), to permit immediate payment of the undisputed amount of an
award, discussed supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. See also Trout v. Lehman, 702 F. Supp.
3, 3-4 (D.D.C. 1988) (following McKenzie, court ordered interim payment of what it deemed an
"irreducible minimum amount" of fees in Title VII case), appeal dismissed sub nom. Trout v. Ball,
No. 88-5264, unpublished order (D.C. Cir. Mar. 30, 1989), petition for rehearinggranted, No. 885264, unpublished order (D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 1989), petition for a writ of mandamus pending sub
nom. In re Ball, No. 89-5137 (D.C. Cir. filed May 15, 1989); King v. Palmer, 641 F. Supp. 186, 189
(D.D.C. 1986) (granting interim awards against District of Columbia in Title VII case limited to
"the core of attorneys' fees and costs that are not seriously contested").
A district court, however, may not create a final fee award by ruling that a certain amount of
interim fees is an irreducible minimum or is undisputed when the government does contest such an
award. Certainly, the court should be able to force the government's hand by ordering the government to make specific objections to the attorney's fee petitions it opposes and by not allowing the
government to sit silently and refuse to respond. In the Trout case, for example, the government had
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ment filed a notice of appeal, it could invoke Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
62(d) to stay the award until after its appellate rights were exhausted. 6 5 For
these reasons, McKenzie and Jurgens cannot be viewed as substantial authority
for the proposition that interim attorney's fee awards are available under Title
VII against the United States.
The Brown decision, on the other hand, made an award in a case that was

far from final resolution. In that case, the government unequivocally opposed an

award of any amount of fees. 66 Although the court suggested that the govern-

ment did not contend that plaintiff would "not ultimately be entitled to an
award of attorney's fees and costs of some kind,"' 67 actually, the government

expressly reserved the possibility of an appeal on the underlying merits. 68 Moreover, in contrast with McKenzie and Jurgens,69 the Brown court made no pre-

tense that there was an irreducible minimum amount of fees that could be
awarded without dispute. Thus, Brown is the only decision forthrightly asserting that courts have the authority to order the government to pay interim attor70
ney's fee awards under Title VII when the award is not final or uncontested.

D.

Interim Fee Awards Under The Freedom Of Information Act
Recently, a growing number of courts also have been asked to pass upon

petitions for interim attorney's fee awards against the United States in Freedom

of Information Act (FOIA) 71 litigation. 72 This type of litigation can be exnot agreed to any irreducible amount of fees and was endeavoring to take discovery concerning the
fee application. At the time the court issued its order awarding interim fees, there was a pending
motion by the government to compel responses to that discovery. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus
at 5-6, 19-20, In re Ball, No. 89-5137 (D.C. Cir. filed May 15, 1989); Appellants' Opposition to
Appellees' Motion for Summary Affirmance at 2-6, Trout v. Ball, No. 88-5264 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 30,
1989); Appellants' Response to Order to Show Cause at 3-4, Trout v. Ball (D.C. Cir. Mar. 30, 1989),
65. McKenzie, 669 F. Supp. at 535 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 62(d)).
66. Brown, 707 F. Supp. at 22, 24.
67. Id. at 22.
68. Id. at 23.
69. See McKenzie, 669 F. Supp. at 530-31 (government conceded an interim award was warranted and suggested an irreducible minimum amount); Jurgens, 660 F. Supp. at 1099 (government
cqnceded that an award was warranted). The Brown decision also contrasts with the decision in
Ti-out v. Lehman, 702 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1988) (discussed in detail supra note 64), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Trout v. Ball, No. 88-5264, unpublished order (D.C. Cir. Mar. 30, 1989), petition for
rehearing granted, No. 88-5264, unpublished order (D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 1989), petition for a writ of
mandamus pending sub nom. In re Ball, No. 89-5137 (D.C. Cir. filed May 15, 1989). In Trout the
court limited the interim award of fees to a "minimum irreducible amount" that the court characterized as "undisputed." Trout, 702 F. Supp. at 3.
70. In Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the District of Columbia Circuit, after
concluding that a Title VII plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees because she was not yet a
prevailing party, suggested that an interim fee award might be appropriate once discrimination had
been established. Id. at 976-77. This comment by the court is entitled to little weight both because it
is dictum and because the court did not consider the stringent standards for interpreting a waiver of
sovereign immunity. In another case, the District of Columbia Circuit implicitly ruled that a district
court cannot order the government to pay a contested award of fees under Title VII before appellate
review. See Parker v. Lewis, 670 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In Parker, the court entered summary
affirrnance of the uncontested portion of an attorney's fee award so that this portion could be paid
over immediately. Id. at 249-50.
71. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
72. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988); Allen v. Department of
Defense, 713 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1989); Irons v. FBI, No. 82-1143-G (D. Mass. June 26, 1987)
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tremely complex and slow-moving, because it sometimes requires painstaking in
camera review by the trial judge of thousands of pages of documents to determine whether statutory exemptions from disclosure permit the government to
withhold the documents in question.73 Because such litigation may drag on for
many years, private litigants and their counsel may become financially strapped
and unable to continue the lawsuit if an award of attorney's fees is postponed
until the completion of the litigation.
Notwithstanding the equities of the situation, the FOIA attorney's fee stat-

ute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), 74 simply makes no provision for an interim award

of fees and the legislative history is silent on the matter. 75 This silence combined
with the strict and narrow construction standards applicable to waivers of sovereign immunity 76 should end the inquiry.
The very language of the provision appears to preclude awards of fees

before the litigation is concluded. Subsection 552(a)(4)(E) states that "[t]he
court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other

litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the
complainant

has

substantially

prevailed."' 77

Thus,

under

Subsection

552(a)(4)(E), fees may only be awarded to a plaintiff who has "substantially prevailed" in the "case." The pertinent question, then, is not whether a party has
succeeded on one or more issues, but whether that party has substantially prevailed in the case as a whole. 78 For that reason, as one district court has ruled,

the "proper evaluation and weighing of the relevant criteria could not be complete until the suit is complete."'79 Or, as the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit put it, the governing statutory standard for fees
in FOIA cases is whether the plaintiff has "substantially prevailed as to his overall request." 80

Until quite recently, district courts uniformly have rejected petitions by
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Powell v. Department of Justice, 569 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Cal.
1983); Hydron Laboratories, Inc. v. EPA, 560 F. Supp. 718 (D.R.I. 1983); Diamond v. FBI, 532 F.
Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 707 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1983); Letelier v. Department of Justice, I
Gov't Disclosure Serv. (P-H) 80,252 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 1980); Biberman v. FBI, 496 F. Supp. 263,
265 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
73. See I J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 8.01, at 8-3 (1988) ("The elements of the FOIA case.. . should be seen in the context of a months-long or years-long controversy
between citizen and agency which can be expected to tax the patience of each.").
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982).
75. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. REP. No. 93-876, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6267; S. CONF. REP. No.
1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6285; S.REP.No.
854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
76. See, e.g., Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982).
78. For discussion of an argument that a FOIA case can be broken into phases for purposes of
awarding attorney's fees, see infra note 92.
79. Letelier v. Department of Justice, 1 Gov't Disclosure Serv. (P-H) 80,252 (D.D.C. Oct. 2,
1980); see also Irons v. FBI, No. 82-1143-G (D. Mass. June 26, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file) ("It is necessary to wait till [sic] the close of litigation to put in focus the advances and retreats,
gains and losses made by the parties in their conflict over the scope of disclosures.").
80. Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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plaintiffs for interim fee awards in FOIA cases, expressing concern that allowing
piecemeal adjudication of attorney's fee issues would result in duplicative requests for further fees at each successive stage of the litigation.8" Moreover,
such awards would deter agencies from settling cases partially or disclosing portions of the entire record. 82 One district court indicated interim fees might be
possible under extenuating circumstances, but acknowledged that the court can
83
address attorney's fee awards "more efficiently" at the conclusion of a case.
One district judge, however, in two recent cases departed from that uniform
practice of refusing to award interim fees in FOIA cases. 84 When the government sought interlocutory review from one of those decisions, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to overturn the award as improper. 85 Since the Ninth Circuit's ruling, one other86district court has followed
suit by allowing an interim award in a FOIA case.
In Powell v. Department ofJustice8 7 a district judge ruled that interim fees
were available under FOIA, citing the general intent of Congress to permit fees
to plaintiffs in meritorious FOIA litigation.88 The court set forth certain guidelines for interim fees, focusing particularly upon whether the plaintiff and his
counsel would suffer substantial hardship from a delay in the award of fees and
whether there had been unreasonable delay on the government's part in the
89
litigation.
In a subsequent case, Rosenfeld v. Department of Justice,90 this same district judge entertained a petition for interim fees after ruling against the government on a preliminary issue concerning waiver of FOIA document processing
fees. 91 Although the plaintiff had yet to achieve any victory with respect to
disclosure of documents withheld as exempt, the district court nevertheless
81. See, e.g., Irons v. FBI, No. 82-1143-G (D. Mass. June 26, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file); Hydron Laboratories, Inc. v. EPA, 560 F. Supp. 718, 722 (D.R.I. 1983); Letelier, I Gov't
Disclosure Serv. q 80,252; see also Diamond v. FBI, 532 F. Supp. 216, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd,
707 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting request for interim attorney's fees in FOIA case but without
expressing concern about duplicative requests). The district court decision in Ettlinger v. FBI, 596
F. Supp. 867 (D. Mass. 1984), has been mistakenly cited as granting attorney's fees in a FOIA case
on an interlocutory basis. See Irons, No. 82-1143-G. To the contrary, nothing in the decision reflects that the fees were awarded on an interim basis or that further litigation was anticipated after
the award of fees. Indeed, the court's unqualified statement that the plaintiff had "prevailed on both
counts in her complaint," Ettlinger, 596 F. Supp. at 880, firmly establishes that the court thought
that the litigation was at an end. Also, the court did not require the government to pay the fees
immediately prior to final judgment, but instead encouraged the parties to stipulate as to the amount
of fees. Id. at 882.
82. Letelier, I Gov't Disclosure Serv. 1 80,252.
83. Biberman v. FBI, 496 F. Supp. 263, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
84. Rosenfeld v. Department of Justice, Nos. C-85-2247 MHP & C-85-1709 MHP (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 1987) (Patel, J.), appeal dismissed and mandamus denied, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988);
Powell v. Department of Justice, 569 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (Patel, J.).
85. Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988).
86. See Allen v. Department of Defense, 713 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1989).
87. 569 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (Patel, J.).
88. Id. at 1197-98.
89. Id. at 1200.
90. Nos. C-85-2247 MHP & C-85-1709 MHP (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 1987), appeal disnissed and
mandamus denied, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988).
91. Id.; see also Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 719 (describing proceedings in the district court).
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awarded interim attorney's fees to plaintiff and ordered the government to pay
these fees within sixty days. 92 The principal part of the case, concerning the
application of various statutory exemptions from disclosure to those documents
93
withheld by the government, was still pending before the district court.
After obtaining a stay of the district court's order of immediate payment
from the Ninth Circuit, the government filed an interlocutory appeal and, in the
alternative, a petition for a writ of mandamus. 94 The government contended
that the district court had acted beyond its jurisdictional authority in awarding
95
attorney's fees against the sovereign before the completion of the litigation.
The government argued that the FOIA attorney's fee provision did not authorize the extraordinary remedy of interim fees and that the Judgment Fund statutes, Sections 1304 and 2414, precluded payment of any award until there was a
final judgment and all appeals had been exhausted. 96 Because the government
contested both the underlying fee waiver determination and the award of attorney's fees, the government contended that it could not legally pay the interim
97
award.
Acknowledging the exceptional importance of the government's challenge
to the district court's jurisdiction, the court of appeals exercised supervisory
mandamus jurisdiction to review the matter as an issue of first impression.9"
92. See Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 719. Even though the litigation was not complete and one could
not yet determine whether plaintiff had substantially prevailed in the case as a whole, the district
court ruled that the initial proceedings were a "sufficiently separable" and "discrete" phase of the
litigation to permit a separate interim fee award. Rosenfeld, Nos. C-85-2247 MHP & C-85-1709
MHP, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 1987); see also Allen v. Department of Defense, 713 F. Supp. 7,
12 (D.D.C. 1989) (speaking of FOIA proceedings as having "two discrete phases"); Irons v. FBI,
No. 82-1143-G (D. Mass. June 26, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (citing Powell for theory
that FOIA litigation has distinct phases); Powell, 569 F. Supp. at 1196-97 (speaking of FOIA litigation as having "separate" and "distinct" phases). There is no support in the statute for this bifurcation of the litigation into "phases" for awarding attorney's fees at successive stages of the lawsuit.
On the contrary, the governing standard is whether the plaintiff has "substantially prevailed as to his
overall request." Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
93. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 719.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 719-20.
96. Id. at 725-26.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 722-23. The court rejected the government's argument that an interlocutory appeal
should lie under the collateral order doctrine or other exceptions to the general requirement of a final
decision before appeal. Id. at 720-22. The court did not address the government's principal argument that, absent an immediate appeal, the United States would be left in the untenable position of
either paying an illegal award in violation of express statutes or not paying the award under threat of
contempt by the district court. See Brief for Appellants and Petition for a Writ of Mandamus at 2433, Rosenfeld (No. 87-2975). The government's overriding concern was with upholding the integrity
of the Judgment Fund statutes, which expressly bar premature payment, even when later recoupment might be possible. Id. The government argued that this unique injury to the government's
sovereign immunity and the integrity of the governing statutes, not the economic impact of this
particular award, caused irreparable harm and justified immediate appellate review. Id.; see also
Reply Brief for Appellants-Petitioners at 12-14, Rosenfeld (No. 87-2975) (stating that the issue was
not "economic hardship" but whether "the sovereign United States may unlawfully be compelled to
violate express federal statutes while this Court of law may only stand helplessly by"). The court
discussed only the government's alternative argument that an interim attorney's fee award should be
immediately appealable if there is no assurance that the money could be recouped if the award is
overturned later. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 720-22; see also infra notes 283-310 and accompanying text
(discussing appealability of interim fee awards).
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The Ninth Circuit then held that the FOIA attorney's fee provision, although it

contains no language on interim fees, implicitly authorizes such a remedy because it promotes the policy of encouraging efforts by citizens to seek disclosure

of government documents. 99 The court also dismissed the bar on payment of

nonfinal awards in the Judgment Fund statutes by ruling that the FOIA attor-

ney's fee provision, now construed to permit interim fee awards, supersedes
these statutes. 100

The Ninth Circuit's analysis is mistaken and is particularly vulnerable because the court failed to apply certain basic legal standards that the Supreme
Court has established as fundamental canons of statutory interpretation. First,
the Supreme Court has instructed courts to construe waivers of sovereign immu-

nity strictly and narrowly in favor of the government. 01 The Rosenfeld court,
far from viewing the statute narrowly in favor of the government, expansively
construed the FOIA attorney's fees provision to implicitly authorize interim fee

awards. To reach this conclusion, the court largely adopted the reasoning of the
district court in the Powell decision, 10 2 saying it could "add little" to the district

court's "thorough analys[i]s."' 0 3 The Powell decision, however, failed even to
mention the doctrine of sovereign immunity; instead, it unhesitatingly embraced

decisions permitting interim fees against nonfederal government parties and ne04
glected the strict standards for interpreting waivers of sovereign immunity.'
By adopting the Powell analysis as its own, the Ninth Circuit perpetuated this
error.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit overlooked the actual language of the FOIA
attorney's fees provision, failing to consider the implicit preclusion of interim
99. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 723-25.
100. Id. at 725-27.
101. "Waivers of immunity must be 'construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,' McMahon v.
United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951), and not 'enlarge[d] . . . beyond what the language requires.'
Eastern TransportationCo. v. UnitedStates, 272 U.S. 675, 686 (1927)." Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,
463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983); see also Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986) (quoting
same sources).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89 for discussion of the Powell decision. The Rosenfeld court also cited Biberman v. FBI, 496 F. Supp. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), in which a district court
denied an application for interim fees but suggested such an award might be available in an extraordinary case. Biberman, 496 F. Supp. 264-65. The Biberman court did not mention the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. See id.
103. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 724.
104. Powell v. Department of Justice, 569 F. Supp. 1192, 1194-97 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The Powell
decision did cite two cases dealing with requests for fees against the federal government, Van
Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974) and Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). See Powell, at 1195-96. In Van Hoomissen, the Ninth Circuit upheld a fee award against
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Title VII litigation, Van Hoomissen, 503 F.2d at
1133, but this decision cannot provide support for the availability of interim fee awards against the
federal government. First, the fee award in Van Hoomissen was granted to a party who had prevailed in an earlier appeal and then the appellate court ruled on the fee award itself. Id. at 1132-33.
In other words, the fee award was payable only when it became final after the exhaustion of all
appellate review. Second, the Supreme Court cited Van Hoomissen with implicit disapproval in
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 n.4 (1980) (per curiam). See also Proctor v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 795 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986) (saying Hanrahan casts doubt on Van
Hoomissen). In Grubbs, the District of Columbia Circuit denied the request for interim fees and only
suggested in dictum that an interim award might be appropriate at a later stage of the proceedings.
Grubbs, 548 F.2d at 976-77; see also supra note 70 (discussing Grubbs decision).
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awards in the statutory requirement that a court may award a fee only to a
plaintiff who has "substantially prevailed" in the "case" as a whole.' 0 5 In this
way, the court neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that every issue
of statutory interpretation must begin with the language of the statute. 106
The Ninth Circuit instead turned its focus away from the language of the
statute to the legislative history of the FOIA, which it perceived as supporting
an implicit interim fee authorization. 10 7 The court conceded that the legislative
history nowhere directly addresses the availability of interim fee awards; instead,
the court relied on general statements in the legislative reports that Congress
intended for the courts to consider the existing body of attorney's fee law when
formulating the specific criteria for deciding whether to award fees. 10 8 The
court then reasoned that because other attorney's fee statutes have been construed to permit interim fee awards against private parties, the FOIA statute
should be viewed as authorizing interim awards against the government.' 0 9 But,
the legislative direction that the courts consult other attorney's fee statutes when
setting criteria on whether to award fees in FOIA suits cannot provide any guidance on the issue of when courts may order such fees.
Under the strict standards applicable to waivers of sovereign immunity, the
Ninth Circuit should have accepted the silence in the statute and the legislative
history on the availability of interim fees as dispositive. As the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently admonished, "Etlo work abrogation of federal sovereign immunity ....the legislative intent must be so clear and
explicit as to brook no reasonable doubt."" 0 Manifestly, that cannot be said
about the availability of interim attorney's fees under the FOIA.
The Rosenfeld court's most serious error lies in its treatment of the express
finality requirement in the Judgment Fund statutes. Having derived an interim

fees authorization from Subsection 552(a)(4)(E), the Ninth Circuit viewed this
implicit provision as repealing-sub silentio-the Judgment Fund statutes
which expressly limit the payment of awards to final judgments not subject to
further appeal.' 1 ' By holding that a general waiver of sovereign immunitywhich makes no provision for timing of payments-overrides the specific finality
requirement in the Judgment Fund statutes, the court effectively read these provisions out of the statute books.
The court dismissed the Judgment Fund statutes, saying they do not impose
"a superseding limitation on the government's waiver of sovereign immunity"
for attorney's fees in Subsection 552(a)(4)(E)." 2 The fundamental flaw in this
105. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982); see also supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing language of FOIA attorney's fees provision).
106. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
107. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 724-25.
108. Id. at 724; see S. CONF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6285, 6288.

109.
110.
111.
112.

Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 724.
In re Stephen C. Perry, No. 88-1475, slip op. at 23-24 (1st Cir. Aug. 3, 1989).
Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 725-27.
Id. at 726-27.
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theory-that the FOIA attorney's fee provision countermands the finality requirement in the Judgment Fund statutes-is that it rests upon the premise that
the FOIA provision implicitly repeals those statutes. The Supreme Court has

made clear the strong presumption against implicit repeal of statutes.1 3 A
court may infer repeal only when "clear and manifest" evidence establishes that

Congress so intended. 11 4 In addition, when an implicit repeal would expand a
waiver of sovereign immunity, one may argue that the already stringent standard for finding an implicit repeal should be tightened further. Unfortunately,
15
the Ninth Circuit failed to address this objection."

There is no clear and manifest indication of congressional intent to supersede the Judgment Fund statutes. Nothing in the language of Subsection

552(a)(4)(E) or in its legislative history even mentions the possibility of an interim fee award, much less suggests that it was intended to override the finality
requirement in Sections 1304 and 2414.116
Moreover, the question whether to infer a repeal does not arise unless there
is an "irreconcilable conflict"" 17 between the statutes "in the sense that there is a
positive repugnancy between them or that they cannot mutually coexist."' 1 8
The FOIA attorney's fees provision and the Judgment Fund statutes fit neatly
together into an overall framework; there is simply no conflict at all between

Subsection 552(a)(4)(E) and Sections 1304 and 2414. The FOIA provision
waives the government's sovereign immunity for a certain type of remedy-at113. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-91 (1978).
114. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
115. The court relied on two district court decisions awarding interim fees under Title VII that
were discussed earlier in this Article. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 726-27 (citing Jurgens v. EEOC, 660 F.
Supp. 1097 (N.D. Tex. 1987); McKenzie v. Kennickell, 669 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1987)). For a
discussion of Jurgensand McKenzie, see supranotes 44-70 and accompanying text. The Jurgens and
McKenzie decisions had interpreted the broader language of the Title VII attorney's fee provisionexpressly placing the government in the same position as a "private party," 42 U.S.C. § 2000c5(k)-as taking precedence over the Judgment Fund statutes. There is no similar language in the
FOIA provision. Also, the Jurgens and McKenzie cases, as discussed earlier, are probably wrong.
First, Jurgens and McKenzie cannot be reconciled with Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310
(1986), in which the Supreme Court held that statutes placing the United States in the same position
as a private party nevertheless must be "read narrowly to preserve certain immunities that the
United States has enjoyed historically." Id. at 319-20; see supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text
for discussion of the Shaw decision. One of those historical immunities, preserved in the Judgment

Fund statutes, is the immunity from being required to pay money before final judgment. Second,
Jurgens and McKenzie also ignored the presumption against implicit repeal of statutes.
116. The amendment of Section 2414 in 1978 to except money awards under the Contract Disputes Act illustrates that Congress well knows how to exempt certain payments from the requirements of Section 2414 when it intends to do so. See Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95563, § 14(d), 92 Stat. 2383, 2390 (1978); S.REP. No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprintedin 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5235, 5268. Although the Contract Disputes Act excepts contract judgments under that statute from the requirements of Section 2414, payments of such judgments are made from the Judgment Fund and remain subject to Section 1304. 41 U.S.C. § 612
(1982) (providing that judgments under the Contract Disputes Act shall be paid pursuant to 31
U.S.C. § 1304 (1982)). The Comptroller General has interpreted Section 1304 as independently
requiring finality, although payment of partial judgments from the Judgment Fund, which is not
normally permissible, has been allowed in Contract Disputes Act cases. In re Inland Servs. Corp.,
60 Comp. Gen. 573, 574-76 (1981) (construing 31 U.S.C. § 724a, the predecessor to Section 1304, in
the context of the Contract Disputes Act); PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra
note 15, at 11-68 (discussing 60 Comp. Gen. 573 (1981)).
117. Posadas,296 U.S. at 503.
118. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976).
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torney's fees. It makes no provision for the appropriation of funds to pay that
award, the procedures for such payment, or, most importantly, the timing of
such payment.' 1 9 Instead, Sections 1304 and 2414 govern those matters.1 20 An

FOIA attorney's fee award, like any other money judgment payable from the
appropriated Judgment Fund, is payable only pursuant to Sections 1304 and
2414 after its finality is certified by the Attorney General and the Comptroller
General. Because the "statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the
courts ... to regard each as effective."' 2 1
Even if there were some ambiguity in the Judgment Fund statutes, the clear
precedent of the Comptroller General establishes that such attorney's fees
awards are payable from the Fund subject to the statutory finality requirement.1 22 The courts must defer to the Comptroller General as the official designated by statute to certify payment to the Treasury if the Comptroller General's
opinion is "based on a permissible construction of the statute.".1 23 The Ninth
Circuit in Rosenfeld did not acknowledge the Comptroller General's opinion or
accord it due deference.
Finally, in declining to enforce the finality limitations of the Judgment
Fund statutes,1 24 the Rosenfeld court offered the unsupported and conclusory
119. See supra note 21 (the Judgment Fund and the attendant finality requirement apply to an
award unless it is made under a statute that expressly provides for payment of the award from
another appropriation).
120. See International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Boeing Co., 833 F.2d 165,
169 (9th Cir. 1987) (implicit repeal of a statute occurs only if there is an irreconcilable conflict, and
"[n]o conflict exists if the two statutes serve independent and separate purposes"), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 1488 (1988).
121. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
The Rosenfeld decision confirms the concerns expressed by then Judge Scalia in explaining the
importance of the doctrine disfavoring implicit repeals of statutes:
It will not do to give this principle [presumption against implied repeals] mere lip service
and vacillating practical application. A steady adherence to it is important, primarily to
facilitate not the task of judging but the task of legislating. It is one of the fundamental
ground rules under which laws are framed....
... The major rationale of the presumption, in modern times at least, is not that
Congress is unlikely to change the law ... ; but rather, that Congress "legislate[s] with
knowledge of former related statutes," Continental Insurance Co. v. Simpson, 8 F.2d 439,

442 (4th Cir. 1925), and will expressly designate the provisions whose application it wishes
to suspend, rather than leave that consequence to the uncertainties of implication compounded by the vagaries of judicial construction.
United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986).
122. hit re Attorney Fees-Judicial Awards Under Equal Access to Justice Act, 63 Comp. Gen.
260, 261 (1984) (Judgment Fund is source for payment of attorney's fee awards against United
States, including awards under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), provided
the award is final); Comp. Gen. Op. No. B-208999 (Sept. 13, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library, CoinGen file) (interim attorney's fee award against United States may not be paid when the Attorney
General has determined to appeal the award because the award is not then final within the meaning
of Sections 2414 and 3104).
123. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 108 S. Ct. 413, 421 (1987);
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
124. The court cited the legislative history of the Judgment Fund statutes for the proposition
that Congress did not intend the express limitation on payment of nonfinal awards to be a condition
on waivers of sovereign immunity. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 727 (citing S. REP. No. 733, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess., reprintedin 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2439). On the contrary, the Senate
report expressly warned that the creation of the Judgment Fund was not to be construed as expanding any waiver of sovereign immunity. S. REP. No. 733, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1961
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opinion that "[ihe government's insistence that the Judgment Fund is the only

possible source of payment of an interim fee award is simply wrong."' 25 The
court did not-and could not-identify another source of funds for payment,
however. The Constitution provides that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." 1 26 Congress

exercised this exclusive constitutional power to establish a permanent appropriation in the form of the Judgment Fund as the source for payment of awards and
judgments rendered against the United States. That statutory mandate cannot

be ignored; nor can funds appropriated for other designated purposes be di12 7
verted to pay court awards.

Notwithstanding the rulings of the Ninth Circuit and a smattering of district courts in the context of Title VII and the FOIA, 128 the Judgment Fund
statutes pose an insurmountable obstacle to interim attorney's fee awards against
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2439, 2440. Even if there were no Judgment Fund, an interim
award under the FOIA could not be paid out of agency funds appropriated for other purposes, but
instead would be administered in the manner applicable to awards issued before the creation of the
permanent Judgment Fund appropriation. Prior to the adoption of the Judgment Fund provisions in
1956, judgments awarded against the United States generally could not be paid until after the enactment of specific appropriations legislation for that purpose. S. REP. No. 733, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2439, 2439, 2441. If interim fee awards
against the United States are not payable out of the Judgment Fund, the plaintiff should be relegated
to the pre-Judgment Fund procedure of waiting for Congress to pass a private bill approving an
appropriation to satisfy her award. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
125. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 727. The court also noted "that when a court has rejected the
Judgment Fund argument, the government has managed to pay the interim award." Id. The Ninth
Circuit was citing Jurgens v. EEOC, 660 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Tex. 1987), which described a prior
unpublished district court decision, in which the government paid an interim fee award under threat
of sanctions. Jurgens, 660 F. Supp. 1101-02 (citing Shafer v. Commander, Army and Air Force
Exch. Serv., No. CA 3-76-1246-R (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 1985)). The Jurgens court stated that, because
the government paid the Shafer interim award notwithstanding the Judgment Fund restrictions
when faced with a citation for contempt of court, the court "believefd] that the EEOC can also
arrange for immediate payment of this court's interim award." Id. at 1102. This is not a legitimate
argument in support of awards of interim fees against the federal government. Even though the
United States has suffered previous blows to its sovereign immunity and has acceded to the violation

of the Judgment Fund statutes under threat of contempt, this hardly justifies the conclusion that it
should be forced to do so again in future cases.
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.7.
127. Comp. Gen. Op. No. B-208999 (Sept. 13, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library, ComGen file)
(when interim attorney's fee award against United States could not be made from the Judgment
Fund because it was not final, no other appropriation was legally available to make the payment); see
also Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (I
1 How.) 272, 291 (1850) (no officer of the United States, no matter
how high, is authorized to pay a debt due from the United States Treasury, whether or not reduced
to judgment, unless an appropriation has been made for that purpose, citing U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9);
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889, 906 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (same). There are administrative and criminal penalties for diverting funds from the purpose for which they were appropriated. See 31 U.S.C. § 1518 (1982) (administrative penalties); id. § 1519 (criminal penalties).
128. One district court also has awarded interim attorney's fees against the Environmental Protection Agency in a citizens suit under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982). Citizens for
a Better Env't v. Costle, No. 80 C 0003 (N.D. I1l. May 27, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
Attorney's fee awards made pursuant to the Clean Air Act's attorney's fees provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(d) (1982), are payable only from the Judgment Fund, not from agency funds. The government did not question the court's authority to enter an interim fee award, however, and the court did
not consider the doctrine of sovereign immunity or the Judgment Fund statutes. The court based
the award on two concluded counts of the case, and the court did not mandate immediate payment
before appeal.
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the United States. Because the Ninth Circuit is the only court of appeals that
has addressed this matter to date, other courts presented with the issue will have
to confront the Rosenfeld decision.1 29 For the reasons stated above, the Ninth
Circuit's Rosenfeld decision is seriously flawed and other courts should decline

to follow it. 130

Although one can make strong policy arguments for the availability of an
interim remedy for parties in litigation with the government, at least in extraordinary circumstances, the courts are not free to "improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law."' 13 1 Congress alone should make
such adjustments as it deems appropriate.

II.

AWARDS OF INTERIM FEES PAYABLE FROM AGENCY FUNDS

As a general rule, agency operating appropriations are not available to pay
money judgments, including awards of attorney's fees. 13 2 Thus, the sole source
of payment for judgments and associated attorney's fee awards is ordinarily the
Judgment Fund, with its attendant express finality requirement. There are exceptions to this general rule, however, when separate agency funds are made
available by statute for the payment of judgments and when other express provisions of law include such authority. 133
Although attorney's fee awards under most statutes waiving the immunity
of the federal government are payable only from the Judgment Fund, in practice
most attorney's fee awards against the government are paid from agency funds.
This is because most fee awards against the government today are made under
the Equal Access to Justice Act,' 34 which expressly provides for payment of
certain fee awards from agency funds.' 35 In addition, when judgments are is-

sued against agencies with statutory "sue-and-be-sued" authority and against
government corporations, 136 fee awards also may be payable from separate
37
agency or corporate funds.'
129. One other district court has adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach, with no independent
analysis, and has permitted an interim fee award against the government in a FOIA case. See Allen
v. Department of Defense, 713 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1989).
130. The issue is pending before the District of Columbia Circuit on appeal and petition for a
writ of mandamus from an interim attorney's fee award in a Title VII case. Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.
Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal dismissed sub nom. Trout v. Ball, No. 88-5264, unpublished order
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 30, 1989), petitionfor rehearinggranted, No. 88-5264, unpublished order (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 24, 1989), petition for a writ of mandamus pendingsub nom. In re Ball, No. 89-5137 (D.C. Cir.
filed May 15, 1989). For discussion of the Trout case, see supra note 64.
131. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
132. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 15, at 12-3; see also 34 Comp.
Gen. 221, 224 (1954); 15 Comp. Gen. 933, 934-35 (1936) (in the absence of a specific statutory
provision for payment of judgments, judgments against the government cannot be paid from agency
appropriations); supra note 21 (an award must be paid from the Judgment Fund unless another
statute expressly provides for payment of the award from another appropriation).
133. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 15, at 12-3.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
135. Id. § 2412(c)(2), (d)(4); see also infra notes 151 and 155 and accompanying text (explaining
that certain attorney's fee awards under this statute are payable from agency funds).
136. See infra notes 165-231 and accompanying text.
137. In every case, there is only one possible source of payment for a judgment and fee award,
depending upon the nature of the judgment and the applicable statutes. If an agency appropriation
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When a fee award is payable from agency funds, rather than from the Judgment Fund, the express finality requirement established in Section 2414 does not
apply. Is it true that, read in isolation, Section 2414 appears to require that the
Attorney General certify the finality of all judgments for settlement by the General Accounting Office (GAO) before payment is proper. The statute is not lim-

ited expressly to those judgments that are payable from the Judgment Fund
under Section 1304. Therefore one could make an argument that all judgments,
even when payable from separate agency funds, remain subject to the finality
requirement in Section 2414. In practice, however, Section 2414 has not been so
138
understood or applied.
Section 2414 provides for payment of "final judgments" upon "settlements"
by the GAO. The Attorney General's certification that the judgment is final is
necessary before the GAO properly can exercise its settlement responsibility.
The Comptroller General, however, has taken the position that when a statute
authorizes payment of judgments from agency funds, GAO involvement is not
required. Realistically, GAO involvement would serve no useful purpose. Each
agency knows best which of its appropriation accounts should be charged with a
judgment. If GAO settled such judgments, it would have to request this information from the agency, which would delay unnecessarily the payment of the
judgment.
For this reason, the GAO's practice over the past thirty years has been to
generally view the two provisions in Section 2414 concerning finality of the judgment and the GAO's settlement authority as inextricably intertwined. The Section 2414 finality requirement comes into play only when the GAO has
settlement responsibility, which occurs only when payment is to be made out of
the Judgment Fund pursuant to Section 1304. In contrast, when a judgment is
payable from agency funds, and the GAO is not involved in settlement, the finality requirement falls out. In other words, Sections 2414 and 1304 work together
as a statutory package, requiring finality only of judgments to be paid from the
Judgment Fund.
That the courts have interpreted more readily those statutes permitting fee
awards from agency funds as allowing interim aWards confirms this approach.
Although such statutes still constitute waivers of sovereign immunity that
should be construed narrowly, there are nevertheless substantial grounds to conis legally available for payment of a judgment, the Judgment Fund is not available, even as an alter-

native if agency funds are low. If agency appropriations are not expressly available for the payment
of judgments, the Judgment Fund is the only available source. One statute, however, appears to
allow the court to frame its judgment to determine the source of the payment. Under the Government-in-the-Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1982), the court may assess attorney's fees and litigation
costs against the government in favor of a substantially prevailing party. Id. § 552b(i). The statute
states, however, that "[i]n the case of assessment of costs against an agency, the costs may be as-

sessed by the court against the United States." Id. Even under that statute, once the court issues its
judgment and exercises its apparent right of choice, only one source of payment is possible.
138. The discussion concerning the practice of the Comptroller General with respect to settlements pursuant to Section 2414 is based upon the author's personal knowledge and experience as a
litigator with the Department of Justice, as well as interviews by the author with attorneys in the
Office of the General Counsel of the General Accounting Office.
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elude that Congress intended to waive immunity from interim awards in those

contexts in which it has made agencies directly liable for attorney's fees.
A.

The Equal Access to Justice Act

Congress enacted the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) 139 "to diminish

the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action by providing in specified situations an award of attorney fees, expert witness
14 °
In Subsection 2412(d),14 1
fees, and other costs against the United States."'

the Act provides that a court shall award fees' 42 to any party meeting specified
qualifications 14 3 who prevails in a nontort civil action against the federal government, "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substan-

tially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust."' 144 In sum,
EAJA Subsection 2412(d) generally authorizes an award of attorney's fees
whenever the government's position in the litigation was not "substantially justi45
fied," that is, not "justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person."'
A separate subsection of the EAJA, Subsection 2412(b), subjects the United
States to liability for attorney's fees "to the same extent that any other party
would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which
specifically provides for such an award."' 46 This provision makes the govern-

ment liable for fees under common-law and statutory fee-shifting rules to the
139. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The original EAJA, which was enacted in 1980
as an experimental program with a "sun-set" provision, expired by its own terms on October 1, 1984.
Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, Title II, § 204(c), 94 Stat. 2325, 2329 (1980). Congress
reenacted the EAJA, with some clarifying amendments, as a permanent statute in 1985. Act of Aug.
5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 6(a), 99 Stat. 183, 186 (1985). On the EAJA, see generally Pierce v.
Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2546-51 (1988); 2 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 1, § 7.04[4]; J.
BENNETT, supra note 1, §§ 1.01-1.04 (same).
140. Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, Title II, § 202(c)(1), 94 Stat. 2325, 2325 (1980)
(not codified).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (Supp. V 1987).
142. The EAJA places a specific cap on permissible fee awards by directing that fees "shall not
be awarded in excess of $75 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living
or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved,
justifies a higher fee." Id. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
143. The EAJA establishes various eligibility qualifications for an award of fees under Subsection 2412(d). Under this provision, only individuals whose net worth does not exceed $2 million,
and owners of businesses, partnerships, corporations, associations, units of local government, and
organizations whose net worth does not exceed $7 million are eligible for a fee. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(B).
Tax-exempt organizations and cooperative agricultural organizations are exempt from the net worth

limitation. Id. In addition, organizational and governmental entities (with no exceptions) are eligible only if they do not employ more than 500 persons. Id.
144. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
145. Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (1988) (the standard adopted by the Supreme

Court is no different from the "reasonable basis both inlaw and fact" formulation adopted by most

courts of appeals); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5003, 5011 ("The test of whether the Government position is substantially
justified is essentially one of reasonableness in law and fact."); H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4984, 4989 ("The test of whether or
not a Government action is substantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness. Where the
Government can show that its case had a reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award will be

made.").
146. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Supp. V 1987).
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same extent as nonfederal government parties. 147 In effect, the statute places the

government on "equal footing" with private parties in terms of liability for attorney's fee awards.

148

Awards of attorney's fees made pursuant to EAJA Subsection 2412(b) are
payable by the United States,'

49

unless the award is based upon the common-

law rule permitting fees for bad faith conduct,' 50 in which case the award must
be charged against agency funds.' 51 The EAJA makes payment of Subsection

2412(b) non-bad faith fee awards expressly subject to the Judgment Fund limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2414.152 The finality limitation in 31 U.S.C. § 1304 and 28
U.S.C. § 2414 discussed previously' 53 therefore applies with full force to most
154
Subsection 2412(b) fee awards.

In contrast with Subsection 2412(b) and with most attorney's fee provisions

waiving the government's sovereign immunity, Subsection 2412(d) of the EAJA
expressly provides that "[flees... awarded under this subsection to a party shall
be paid by any agency over which the party prevails from any funds made available to the agency by appropriation or otherwise."' 55 Consequently, such payments are not made from the Judgment Fund, nor are they subject to any
statutory finality requirement.
Because the EAJA contains no language suggesting that interim fees are
available, one could argue that, under the narrow construction given to waivers
147. Unification Church v. INS, 762 F.2d 1077, 1079-81 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Lauritzen v. Lehman,
736 F.2d 550, 552-54 (9th Cir. 1984); H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprintedin 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4984, 4996.
148. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4984, 4987; J. BENNETr, supra note 1, at 1-26. For example, Subsection 2412(b) incorporates
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Prior to the enactment of
the EAJA, Section 1988 was found not to provide authority for the assessment of fees against the
federal government because it did not contain an express waiver of sovereign immunity. NAACP v.
Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514, 516-21 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980); Shannon v. HUD,
577 F.2d 854, 855-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978). Under the EAJA, however, if the
United States actually has violated one of the civil rights statutes listed in Section 1988, it is now
liable for attorney's fees to the same extent that any other party would be liable. Unification Church,
762 F.2d at 1079-81; Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 552-59; see also Geier v. Richardson, 871 F.2d 1310,
1312 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding, with little discussion, that EAJA Subsection 2412(b) and Section 1988 "operate together to permit the district court in its discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees against the United States" to a prevailing civil rights action party).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(2) (1982) (providing for payment of fee awards under EAJA Subsection 2412(b)). See generally In re Attorney Fees-Judicial Awards Under Equal Access to Justice
Act, 63 Comp. Gen. 260, 262 (1984) (discussing payment of attorney's fee awards under Subsection
2412(b)).
150. See Sanchez v. Rowe, 870 F.2d 291, 293-95 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing, in the context of
EAJA Subsection 2412(b), the bad faith exception to American rule against recovery of attorney's
fees from the losing party).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(2) (1982).
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 14-131 and accompanying text.
154. For discussion of an EAJA Subsection 2412(b) fee award in Young v. Pierce, 822 F.2d 1376
(5th Cir. 1987), see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
155. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4) (Supp. V 1987); see also Electrical Dist. No. 1 v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 813 F.2d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (" '[a]gency operating appropriations are
available to make payments [to satisfy awards under EAJA] unless otherwise prohibited'" (quoting
In re Availability of Funds for Payment of Intervenor Attorney Fees-Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 62 Comp. Gen. 692, 700 (1983))).
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of sovereign immunity,15 6 the government's historical immunity from payment
of awards prior to appellate review should be preserved. However, in striking
contrast with the silence regarding interim fees found in the legislative history of
other statutes waiving the sovereign immunity of the government for fee awards,
the legislative history of the EAJA provides strong support for the implication
of interim fee authority. The Conference Report accompanying the bill stated
that "[a]n award may ... be appropriate where the party has prevailed on an
interim order which was central to the case, or where an interlocutory appeal is
'sufficiently significant and discrete to be treated as a separate unit.' "157
Although interim fee awards remain as uncommon in the EAJA context as they
do elsewhere, the Eleventh Circuit, in Haitian Refugee Center v. Meese,15 8 cited
the legislative history and had little difficulty concluding such a remedy should
be available. 59 The path toward permitting interim fee awards under Subsec-

tion 2412(d) of the EAJA thus appears well marked.
The availability of the EAJA, for interim fee awards or otherwise, must be
qualified. Subsection 2412(d) allows an award of attorney's fees when the government's position is not substantially justified "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically
provided by statute."1 60 Section 206 of the EAJA further states that "[n]othing
in section 2412(d) ... alters, modifies, repeals, invalidates, or supersedes any
other provision of Federal law which authorizes an award" of attorney's fees
against the United States.' 61 In other words, while the EAJA may supplement
existing authorizations for fee awards against the government, 162 it does not
156. See In re Stephen C. Perry, No. 88-1475, slip. op. at 23-24 (1st Cir. Aug. 3, 1989) (the
principle that courts strictly construe waivers of sovereign immunity in favor of the sovereign "applies full bore in the EAJA context"); Unification Church v. INS, 762 F.2d 1077, 1089 (D.C. Cir.
1985) ("It is undisputed that Congress intended by its passage of the [EAJA] to broaden significantly
the number of cases in which fees could be awarded against the federal government. It is equally
true, however, that the language of the Act, as with the language of any waiver of sovereign immunity, is to be construed narrowly.") (citations omitted).
157. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5003, 5011 (citations omitted); see also H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4984, 4990 (same).
158. 791 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir.), as modified on reh'g, 804 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam).
159. Id. at 1495-96; see also Kopunec v. Nelson, 801 F.2d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing
legislative history concerning interim fee awards and permitting award of fees under EAJA when
case was remanded to the agency for ultimate disposition). The Eleventh Circuit held, in accordance
with the legislative history quoted above, supra text accompanying note 157, that the party seeking
an interim fee award must have actually "prevailed" upon a main or central issue in the case. Haitian Refugee Center, 791 F.2d at 1496; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22,
reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5003, 5011 (interim award may be appropriate when the party has prevailed on an interim issue that "was central to the case"); H.R. REP. No.
1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4984, 4990
(same); infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text (comparing the general prevailing party rule for
fee-shifting statutes with the requirements for an interim award of fees under the EAJA).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
161. Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, Title II, § 206, 94 Stat. 2325, 2330 (1980), as
amended by Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 184, 186 (1985) (not codified); see
also H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4984, 4997 (Subsection 2412(d) does not apply to actions "already covered by existing feeshifting statutes"); S. REP. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-22 (1979) (same).
162. What constitutes the use of the EAJA to supplement existing fee-shifting statutes as opposed to impermissible replacing or superseding of such statutes has been the subject of much litiga-
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"replace or supersede any existing fee-shifting statutes such as the Freedom of
Information Act [or] the Civil Rights Acts."' 63 When another statute waiving
the immunity of the government for fees is applicable in a case, that statute

establishes the exclusive basis for a fee award. Thus, a plaintiff may not evade
the finality limitation of Sections 2414 and 1304 for payment of fee awards
against the United States from the Judgment Fund, under statutes such as the

Freedom of Information Act or Title VII, by disavowing the applicable fee-shifting statute in order to seek an interim fee award under Subsection 2412(d) of the

EAJA.
B.

164

"Sue-and-Be-Sued" Agencies and Government Corporations
Certain federal agencies and instrumentalities, by statute, have been shed of

most aspects of sovereign immunity and therefore are more amenable to liability
for judgments and for awards of costs and fees incidental to litigation.1 65 As the
66
Supreme Court held in FederalHousing Administration, Region 4 v. Burr,1

"[W]hen Congress [has] launched a governmental agency into the commercial
world and endowed it with authority to 'sue or be sued,' that agency is not less
amenable to judicial process than a private enterprise under like circumstances
would be."' 67 With these types of agencies and entities, the bar of sovereign
immunity is at its lowest ebb. The traditionally strict and narrow interpretation

of waivers of immunity gives way to a liberal construction; a presumption arises
that restrictions on that waiver are not to be implied.' 68 Accordingly, there are
tion. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Stewart, 718 F.2d 104, 107-08 (4th Cir. 1983) (EAJA applies in Social
Security Act cases to supplement 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1982), which only authorized award of fees
to be paid out of the benefit award), superseded by Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99
Stat. 183, 186 (not codified) (providing that 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1982) shall not prevent award of
fees under EAJA); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915, 918-19 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (EAJA fills gap when fee-shifting provision in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6972(e) (Supp. V 1981), does not apply to appellate petition for review); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 704-06 (3d Cir. 1983) (EAJA supplements Clean Water
Act fee provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976), which allows fees for district court actions but is silent

on fees for appellate petitions for review); United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 678 F,2d 21, 23
(5th Cir. 1982) (EAJA does not encompass condemnation actions that are governed by separate
limited fee-shifting statute, 42 U.S.C. § 4654), rev'd on reh'g, 704 F.2d 800, 804-08 (5th Cir. 1983)
(en bane) (EAJA supplements fee-shifting statute for condemnation actions when that statute would
not permit fees).
163. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4984, 4997.
164. Existing fee-shifting statutes usually are more generous than Subsection 2412(d). Most
other statutes allow fees to parties who have prevailed or substantially prevailed in litigation with the
government, whereas Subsection 2412(d) also requires that the prevailing party establish that the
government's position in the case lacks substantial justification. Although Subsection 2412(d)
greatly expands the contexts in which fee awards may be available against the government, it also
establishes a more stringent standard than most other statutes that waive the government's immunity from liability for fees.
165. If Congress has not decided to allow suits against an agency, such as by empowering the
agency to sue and be sued, then the agency is not a legal entity and the suit may only be brought
against the United States. 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3655, at 214-16 (1985).
166. 309 U.S. 242 (1940).
167. Id. at 245.
168. The Supreme Court explained that:
[S]uch waivers by Congress of governmental immunity in case of such federal instrumen-
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compelling reasons to believe that interim awards of attorney's fees are authorized in the context of "sue-and-be-sued" agencies and federal corporations.
Several federal agencies are amenable to suit under express sue-and-be-sued
clauses that are generally limited to certain specified functions or activities. For
example, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development may sue and be
sued under 12 U.S.C. § 1702169 with respect to the federal mortgage insurance
programs established under the National Housing Act 170 and under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1404a' 7 t with respect to low income housing programs under the United
States Housing Act of 1937.172 Both of these sue-and-be-sued clauses have been

173
the subject of considerable litigation concerning their scope and limitations.

Other agencies that have been granted authority to sue and be sued include the
Small Business Administration 174 and, with respect to certain specified activi176
and the Interior.177
ties, the Secretaries of Commerce, 175 Education,

These sue-and-be-sued clauses waive the immunity of the agency only as to
existing federal or state causes of action and only with regard to the specific
activities enumerated in the statute; they do not grant any substantive rights or

create new causes of actions or standards of liability. 178 For instance, they do

179
not establish any general right of judicial review of administrative actions;

talities should be liberally construed. . . . Hence, when Congress establishes such an
agency, authorizes it to engage in commercial and business transactions with the public,
and permits it to "sue and be sued," it cannot be lightly assumed that restrictions on that
authority are to be implied. Rather if the general authority to "sue and be sued" is to be
delimited by implied exceptions, it must be clearly shown that certain types of suits are not
consistent with the statutory or constitutional scheme, that an implied restriction of the
general authority is necessary to avoid grave interference with the performance of a governmental function, or that for other reasons it was plainly the purpose of Congress to use
the "sue and be sued" clause in a narrow sense. In the absence of such showing, it must be
presumed that when Congress launched a governmental agency into the commercial world

and endowed it with authority to "sue or be sued," that agency is not less amenable to
judicial process than a private enterprise under like circumstances would be.
Id. (footnote omitted).
169. 12 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp. V 1987).
170. Id. §§ 1701-1750g (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1404a (Supp. V 1987).
172. Id. §§ 1437-1437s (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
173. See generally CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES: ITS AGENCIES, OFFICERS

AND EMPLOYEES §§ 6.43 to 6.58, at 407-31 (1982) [hereinafter CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES] (discussing the scope and limitations of the sue-and-be-sued clauses in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1702 and 42 U.S.C. § 1404a as developed in litigation).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(1) (1982) (Small Business Administrator may sue and be sued with respect to all the "functions, powers, and duties" vested in it).
175. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2350 (1982) (Secretary of Commerce may sue and be sued with respect to activities in providing technical and financial assistance to firms under tariff adjustment
program); 42 U.S.C. § 3211(11) (1982) (Secretary of Commerce may sue and be sued with respect to
certain public works and economic development programs).
176. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1132d-l(b)(2) (Supp. V 1987) (Secretary of Education may sue and be
sued with respect to loan programs for construction, reconstruction, and renovation of academic
facilities).
177. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1496(a) (1982) (Secretary of Interior may sue and be sued with respect
to loan guaranty and insurance program to finance economic development of Indians and Indian
organizations).
178. CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, supra note 173, §§ 6.47, 6.50, at 412-14,
415-16.
179. See, e.g., Sapp v. Hardy, 204 F. Supp. 602, 605-06 (D. Del. 1962); Gart v. Cole, 166 F.
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such review instead must be maintained under the Administrative Procedure
Act. 180
Moreover, the courts have construed sue-and-be-sued clauses as limited

waivers of sovereign immunity applying only to suits against the agency and not
applying to suits that are in reality against the United States.18 ' The distinction
between an action properly maintained against the agency and one against the
United States is whether the funds to satisfy any monetary judgment will come
from separate agency funds or from the public Treasury. 182 As the Supreme
Court explained in the Federal Housing Administration case, agency liability
under a sue-and-be-sued clause is limited to "those funds ... which are in [the
183
agency's] possession, severed from Treasury funds and Treasury control."'
With a couple of possible exceptions,1 84 the courts of appeals have entertained
monetary actions against agencies under sue-and-be-sued clauses only if the
plaintiff identified a separate agency fund related to the government program at
issue which, at least in part, received its capital from a source other than the
18 5
public Treasury.
Supp. 129, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959); see
also Armor Elevator Co. v. Phoenix Urban Corp., 655 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1981) (suit alleging
agency's failure to comply with its own regulations is beyond waiver in sue-and-be-sued clause). See
generally CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, supra note 173, § 6.50, at 415-16 (sueand-be-sued clauses do not authorize judicial review of administrative acts).
180. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
181. See, e.g., Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 674-76 (8th Cir.
1986); Falls Riverway Realty v. City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1985); Marcus
Garvey Square, Inc. v. Winston Burnett Constr., 595 F.2d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1979); Carlyle Gardens Co. v. Delaware State Hous. Auth., 659 F. Supp. 1300, 1304 (D. Del. 1987).
182. CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, supra note 173, § 6.51, at 417-18,
183. Federal Hous. Admin., Region 4 v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 250 (1940).
184. In Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1275 n.28 (7th Cir. 1981), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit indicated that Department of Housing and Urban Development
housing assistance funds in a reserve account constituted an "identifiable res" upon which an equitable lien could be imposed in favor of low income tenants claiming third party beneficiary status to a
subsidized rental housing assistance contract. The court, however, did not consider the problems of
sovereign immunity or the jurisdictional limitations of the sue-and-be-sued clause. In Jaimes v. Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority, 833 F.2d 1203, 1208-09 (6th Cir. 1987), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that a sue-and-be-sued clause waived the immunity of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development for an award of damages in a civil rights case
without examining whether a separate agency fund existed for payment of the award. The Jaines
court also failed to distinguish an earlier Sixth Circuit decision, Selden Apartments v. HUD, 785
F.2d 152, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1986), which had held that a civil rights action could not be maintained
under a sue-and-be-sued clause because the judgment would not be recoverable from separate agency
funds as opposed to Treasury funds.
185. See, e.g., Mann v. Pierce, 803 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1986) (HUD general insurance
fund which was funded by deposit of rents from tenants in agency-owned properties); Selden Apartments v. HUD, 785 F.2d 152, 157 (6th Cir. 1986) (civil rights suit for damages against HUD could
not be maintained under sue-and-be-sued clause because judgment would not be recoverable from
separate agency funds but would be satisfied from Treasury funds); Portsmouth Redevelopment and
Hous. Auth. v. Pierce, 706 F.2d 471, 473-74 (4th Cir.) (HUD operating subsidy funds were public
Treasury funds so action could not proceed under sue-and-be-sued clause), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960
(1983); Merrill Tenant Council v. HUD, 638 F.2d 1086, 1092-93 (7th Cir. 1981) (separate fund of
collected rents and security deposits from tenants in properties owned by HUD); Industrial Indem.,
Inc. v. Landrieu, 615 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1980) (general insurance fund obtaining most of its
working capital from proceeds of mortgage insurance program); S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. East Harlem
Pilot Block, 608 F.2d 28, 36 (2d Cir. 1979) (special risk insurance fund receiving most of capital
from mortgage insurance proceeds); see also In re S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. East Harlem Pilot BlockPayment of Judgment, 62 Comp. Gen. 12 (1982) (Comptroller General ruled that judgment arising

1989]

INTERIM ATTORNEY'S FEES

When a suit for monetary relief actually seeks recovery out of "the public
treasury or domain," it must be treated as one against the United States,18 6 usu-

ally under the Tucker Act.' 8 7 The Tucker Act is a jurisdictional statute waiving
the sovereign immunity of the United States for monetary claims "founded

either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United

States,8 8or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort.'

The United States Claims Court possesses trial court jurisdiction over

Tucker Act claims,' 8 9 and district courts retain concurrent jurisdiction over
Tucker Act claims for $10,000 or less. 19 0 Most appeals in cases involving a
Tucker Act claim lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 19 1 The EAJA governs petitions for attor192
ney's fee awards in successful Tucker Act claims against the United States.

Even when a sue-and-be-sued clause authorizes an action against an agency,
the proposition that the clause suffices to waive the immunity of the agency from
awards of attorney's fees is not wholly without doubt, or at least it was not

before the enactment of the EAJA. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled in NAACP v. Civiletti193 that the statute allowing the Small Business Administration to sue and be sued 194 was not a suffiout of HUD's mortgage insurance program must be paid from the special risk insurance fund rather
than the Judgment Fund).
186. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947); Portsmouth Redevelopment and Hous. Auth. v.
Pierce, 706 F.2d 471, 473 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960 (1983).
187. In some cases, parties may be able to maintain actions for monetary relief, other than traditional money damages, through a suit for specific relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 108 S. Ct. 2722 (1988).
The Bowen decision creates a rather uncertain exception to the general principle that monetary
claims against the United States must proceed under the Tucker Act. See id. at 2742-51 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The courts have yet to define the extent to which the Administrative Procedure Act
may be the vehicle for monetary claims under the Bowen analysis. See generally Webster, Beyond
FederalSovereign Immunity: 5 U.S.C. § 702 Spells Relief, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 725 (1988) (suggesting
one possible interpretation of the intersection between the Administrative Procedure Act and the
Tucker Act in the aftermath of Bowen); Sisk, Two Proposalsto Clarify the Tucker Act Jurisdictionof
the Claims Court, 36 FED. BAR NEWS & J.(to be published December, 1989) (criticizing the Bowen
decision and suggesting legislative proposals to restore the Tucker Act as the exclusive vehicle for
monetary claims against the United States).
188. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1) (1982). See generally Bowen v. Massachusetts, 108 S.
Ct. 2722 (1988) (construing the Tucker Act); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (same);
J. STEADMAN, D. SCHWARTZ & S.JACOBY, supra note 29, chs. VII-IX, XI (discussing the Tucker
Act); 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3657
(1985 & Supp. 1988) (same). The Tucker Act "does not create any substantive right enforceable
against the United States for money damages," United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976),
but instead provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for substantive rights "found in some
other source of law," Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982).
190. Id. § 1346(a)(2).
191. Id. § 1295 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 501, 102 Stat. 4652 (1988) (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)). See generally Sisk, Tucker Act Appeals to the FederalCircuit,36
FED. BAR NEWS & J.41 (1989) (discussing appellate jurisdiction over Tucker Act claims).
192. See supra notes 139-164 and accompanying text. The EAJA allows fee awards in both
district court and Claims Court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (Supp. V 1987) (including
Claims Court in definition of "court").
193. 609 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cart. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(1) (1982).
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ciently express waiver of sovereign immunity to allow an award of attorney's
fees against the agency.1 95 However, the court premised its 1979 decision
largely on the theory that the sue-and-be-sued clause could not overcome the

explicit prohibition of fee awards against the government then contained in 28
U.S.C. § 2412.196 Congress has since lifted the former prohibition in Section
2412 and amended the statute through the EAJA to make the government liable
for fees to the same extent as private parties.1 9 7
That development weakens the argument that an implied restriction on fee

awards in sue-and-be-sued clauses "is necessary to avoid grave interference with
the performance of a governmental function."'

98

It now seems appropriate to

read agency sue-and-be-sued clauses more expansively to permit fee awards by
their own terms. Indeed, some courts recently have permitted fee awards pursu-

ant to sue-and-be-sued clauses in cases in which the fees would be paid from
agency funds as an incident to the legal proceedings.1 99

If this approach is correct, and it certainly seems to be, then sue-and-besued clauses should be understood to waive the sovereign immunity of the
agency for fee awards in much the same manner as Subsection 2412(b) of the

Equal Access to Justice Act. 20° As a general waiver of sovereign immunity, the
sue-and-be-sued clause makes the agency amenable to an award of fees in the
same manner as a private party under common-law or statutory fee-shifting

rules. 20 ' And, importantly, by obviating the need for recourse to Subsection
2412(b), under which awards are payable from the Judgment Fund only when

final, 20 2 an award of fees under the sue-and-be-sued clause properly may be paid
from agency funds. Moreover, because courts should construe sue-and-be-sued
clauses liberally, the agency arguably should be liable for awards on an interim
basis.
Again, one must remember that sue-and-be-sued clauses do not create any

new causes of action; that means they also do not establish any new basis for feeshifting. If no existing common law or statutory ground allows for an award of
attorney's fees, the only alternative basis would be Subsection 2412(d) of the

EAJA if the plaintiff can establish that the government's position in the litiga195. NAACP, 609 F.2d at 520 n.12; see also Cassata v. Federal Sav.& Loan Ins. Corp., 445 F.2d
122 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, which is authorized to sue and be sued, was not subject to an award of attorney's fees).
196. NAACP, 609 F.2d at 520 n.12 (discussing baron attorney's fees in 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976)).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Supp. V 1987).
198. Federal Hous. Admin., Region 4 v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940).
199. For example, in Merrill Tenant Council v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, No. 78 C 710 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), the district court
awarded attorney's fees pursuant to a sue-and-be-sued clause under a state fee-shifting statute in a
situation in which the fees were to be paid out of funds within the control of the agency. See also
Merrill Tenant Council v. HUD, 638 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding state fee-shifting
statute applied to agency as incorporated through government contract).
200. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Merrill Tenant Council v. HUD, No. 78 C 710 (N.D. III. Oct. 29, 1987) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (sue-and-be-sued clause waived agency immunity for fees under state feeshifting statute).
202. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
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tion was not substantially justified. 20

3

As discussed earlier, courts have permit-

2 4
ted interim awards under Subsection 2412(d). 0

Moreover, certain statutes by their very terms provide that the "United
States," rather than the agency, must pay the fee award. 20 5 Under such statutes,

even if a judgment for damages against an agency would be payable from a
separate agency fund, any attorney's fee award would be payable by the United
20 6
States from the Judgment Fund, subject to the statutory finality requirement.
Another type of governmental entity, that is very similar to the sue-and-besued clause agency and likewise liberally amenable to suit, is the federal govern-

ment corporation. 20 7 The United States Postal Service, although not statutorily

designated as a corporation, 20 8 is nevertheless a quintessential example of this
' 210
type of entity. 20 9 The Postal Service has the authority to "sue and be sued,"

and has its own claims settlement authority. 21I By statute, a "judgment against
the Government of the United States arising out of activities of the Postal Service shall be paid by the Postal Service out of any funds available to the Postal
203. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (Supp. V 1987).
204. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). A conflict exists between these statutes, providing for payment of fees by the "United States," and the unique statutory provision for the United
States Postal Service, requiring that Service funds cover all judgments arising out of the activities of
the Postal Service. 39 U.S.C. § 409(e) (1982). The more specific Postal Service statute prevails and
attorney's fee awards against the Service are payable out of its own funds rather than the Judgment
Fund. Therefore, the Postal Service may be the only government agency that is properly subject to
an interim fee award under Title VII. See Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 570 F. Supp. 1044
(W.D.N.C. 1983) (court granted interim award of fees against the Postal Service in Title VII case,
with no discussion of the source of payment or whether interim awards are permissible). This is
hardly surprising because, as discussed infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text, the Postal Service
is nearly indistinguishable from government corporations.
206. See supra notes 14-131 and accompanying text. A similar regime prevails in the tax context, although the Internal Revenue Service does not have the capacity to sue and be sued. In re
Morrell, 69 Bankr. 147, 149 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1986). Under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, attorney's fees may be paid to the prevailing party in suits "in connection with the
determination, collection or refund of any tax, interest or penalty." 26 U.S.C. § 7430(a) (1982 &
Supp. V 1987). See generally J. BENNETT, supra note 1, § 6.02, at 6-5 to 6-10 (discussing recovery of
attorney's fees under the Internal Revenue Code). Although the Internal Revenue Service controls a
separate appropriation for payment of tax refunds with interest, that appropriation by its terms is
not available for payment of any other type of award, including attorney's fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2411
(Supp. V 1987). Attorney's fee awards under Section 7430 therefore are payable from the Judgment
Fund pursuant to the finality requirement. See In re Source of Funds for Payment of Awards Under
26 U.S.C. 7430, 63 Comp. Gen. 470 (1984).
207. See generally J. STEADMAN, D. SCHWARTZ & S.JACOBY, supra note 29, § 16.117, at 34548 (discussing government corporations).
208. When the term "government corporation" is used, it ordinarily refers to those entities designated as corporations by law and identified in the Government Corporation Control Act, 31
U.S.C. § 9101 (1982). Although the Postal Service does not fall in this category, it is nevertheless a
useful example because it enjoys powers similar to those of corporations, its sovereign immunity has
largely been waived, and judgments against it are paid from Postal Service funds.
209. See generally Loeffler v. Frank, 108 S.Ct. 1965 (1988) (discussing nature of United States
Postal Service and its amenability to suit); Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S.
512 (1984) (same).
210. 39 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1982) (Postal Service may "sue and be sued in its official name").
211. Id. § 401(8) (Postal Service may "settle and compromise claims by or against it"); id.
§ 2603 (Postal Service may "adjust and settle" claims for damage to property and persons).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

Service. ' 212 The Supreme Court has held that "[b]y launching 'the Postal Service into the commercial world,' and including a sue-and-be-sued clause in its
charter, Congress has cast off the Service's 'cloak of sovereignty' and given it the
'status of a private commercial enterprise.' "213 Thus, the Postal Service "is
designed to be self-supporting and to operate very much like a commercial business." 2 14 At times, courts have suggested rather baldly that the Postal Service
2 16
2 15
retains no sovereign immunity, although this is certainly an overstatement.
Examples of entities that Congress actually has designated as government
corporations and that frequently face litigation include the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 21 7 the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, 21 8 the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 21 9 the Export-Import
22 1
and Amtrak. 222
Bank, 220 the Tennessee Valley Authority,
212. Id. § 409(e).
213. Loeffler, 108 S.Ct. at 1970 (quoting Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 317 n.5
(1986); FranchiseTax Bd., 467 U.S. at 520).
214. Perez v. United States, 830 F.2d 54, 60 (5th Cir. 1987).
215. See, e.g., FranchiseTax Bd., 467 U.S. at 519-20 & n.12 (citing lower federal court cases for
the proposition that "the Postal Reorganization Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity");
Harrison v. United States Postal Serv., 840 F.2d 1149, 1152 n.6 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The Postal Service
has no sovereign immunity."); Springer v. Seamen, 821 F.2d 871, 880 n.9 (lst Cir. 1987); Active Fire
Sprinkler Corp. v. United States Postal Serv., 811 F.2d 747, 752-53 (2d Cir. 1987).
216. The Postal Service remains "an independent establishment of the executive branch of the
Government of the United States," 39 U.S.C. § 201 (1982), and "operate[s] as a basic and fundamental service provided to the people by the Government of the United States," id. § 101(a). The courts

have understood that the Postal Service retains at least some incidents of sovereign immunity. See,
e.g., Rider v. United States Postal Serv., 862 F.2d 239, 242 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying rule precluding
estoppel of federal government to Postal Service notwithstanding waiver of sovereign immunity in
sue-and-be-sued clause), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 2430 (1989); Young v. United States Postal Serv.,
698 F. Supp. 1139, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Postal Service is part of government for purpose of rule
barring jury trials in suits against the United States and sue-and-be-sued clause does not waive immunity from jury trial), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Young, 869 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1989). But
see Azar v. United States Postal Serv., 777 F.2d 1265, 1271 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding Postal Service
subject to estoppel by employee misstatement).
217. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 Fourth (1982) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation "shall become a
body corporate and as such shall have power . . . [t]o sue or be sued"); see also 31 U.S.C.
§ 9101(2)(C) (1982) (listing Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as a "mixed-ownership Government corporation"). But cf. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 789 F.2d
313, 315 (5th Cir. 1986) (describing essential governmental nature of Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation's functions in maintaining and regulating the banking system).
218. 12 U.S.C. § 1725(c)(4) (1982) (Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation "shall
become a body corporate, and shall be an instrumentality of the United States, and as such shall
have power... [t]o sue and be sued"); see also 31 U.S.C. § 9101(3)(E) (1982) (listing Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation as a "wholly owned Government corporation").
219. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1982) (establishing Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation as "a body
corporate" within the Department of Labor); id. § 1302(b)(1) (empowering Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation "to sue and be sued ... in its corporate name"); see also 31 U.S.C. § 9101(3)(I)
(1982) (listing Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation as a "wholly owned Government corporation"). See generally Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 214 (1986) (litigation
against the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray &
Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720 (1984) (same).
220. 12 U.S.C. § 635(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987) ("[tlhere is created a corporation with the name Export-Import Bank of the United States, which shall be an agency of the United States of America"
and which "is authorized and empowered . . . to sue and to be sued"); see also 31 U.S.C.
§ 9101(3)(B) (1982) (listing the Export-Import Bank as a "wholly owned Government corporation"). See generally Nu-Air Mfg. Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 822 F.2d 987, 996 (11th Cir. 1987)
(discussing waiver of immunity of the Export-Import Bank), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1270 (1988).
221. 16 U.S.C. § 831c(b) (1982) (Tennessee Valley Authority has the power to "sue and be sued
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Federal government corporations are amenable to suit in much the same
manner as the sue-and-be-sued clause agencies, except that even the last vestiges
of sovereign immunity have largely been stripped away from these instrumentalities. Judgments against government corporations, including awards incidental
to litigation, are payable from corporation funds without any appropriation by
Congress to pay the judgment. 223 Whether government corporations retain
even a small measure of immunity depends on whether Congress has chosen to
224
confer such protection.
Because many government corporations are financially self-sufficient and
are designed to operate much like commercial businesses, it is appropriate to
regard their immunity from legal process very narrowly. Courts should con-

strue waivers of sovereign immunity broadly when a governmental entity's activities "are

primarily

commercial and

.

.

those activities aspire to

profitability. '225 For these reasons, the discussion above regarding agencies' liability for attorney's fees under sue-and-be-sued clauses applies with additional
force to government corporations. Because many government corporations are
essentially commercial in nature and because any award of fees would be paid

out of corporate funds, not the public Treasury, it seems especially appropriate

226
for interim attorney's fee awards to be available against such entities.

However, even when an action would otherwise fall within the scope of an
in its corporate name"); see also 31 U.S.C. § 9101(3)(M) (1982) (listing the Tennessee Valley Authority as a "wholly owned Government corporation").
222. 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1982) (the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) is not "an
agency or establishment of the United States Government" and, to the extent consistent with the
statute, is subject to the District of Columbia Business Corporation Act); see also 31 U.S.C.
§ 9101(2)(A) (1982) (listing Amtrak as a "mixed-ownership Government corporation"). This
unique statutory provision clearly evinces Congress' intention that Amtrak not retain any incidents

of sovereign immunity other than those expressly reserved in the statute. See Kimbrough v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 549 F. Supp. 169, 173 (M.D. Ala. 1982) ("Amtrak is to be considered a
private corporation rather than a federal government entity").
223. Walling v. Norfolk S. Ry., 162 F.2d 95, 97 (4th Cir. 1947) (judgment for costs against
government corporation is payable from corporation funds without the need for an appropriation by
Congress to pay the judgment).
224. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 592 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979). See generally CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 173, § 1.5, at 9 (the doctrine of sovereign immunity generally does not apply to government
corporations); J. STEADMAN, D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, supra note 29, § 16.121, at 350-52 (discussing immunity of government corporations). There is authority for the proposition that even
when Congress has not made a government corporation expressly amenable to suit, the entity still
does not enjoy sovereign immunity. In Kiefer & Kiefer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S.
381 (1939), the Supreme Court held that the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation was subject
to suit even absent a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. Id at 389-94. The Court reached this
conclusion, however, primarily because the parent corporation of this regional entity was expressly
subject to suit under a sue-and-be-sued clause. Id. at 392-93. More recently, the Court has construed its prior decisions allowing judgments, including awards of costs, against the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation to be based upon the express statutory grant of authority to "sue and be sued."
NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 143 n.2 (1971).
225. A.L.T. Corp. v. Small Business Admin., 823 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1987).
226. In at least two reported decisions, courts granted interim attorney's fee awards against the
United States Postal Service, although neither decision addressed sovereign immunity concerns or
the threshold question whether interim awards are permissible in the first instance. See Mantolete v.
Bolger, 791 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1986) (awarding interim fees under Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (1982)); Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 570 F. Supp. 1044, 1046-47
(W.D.N.C. 1983) (awarding interim fees under Title VII).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

agency's or government corporation's sue-and-be-sued clause, there are exceptions to the general rules that such actions may be maintained directly against
the agency or corporation and that any judgment will be satisfied from agency or

227
corporation funds. Perhaps most importantly, the Federal Tort Claims Act
modifies the sue-and-be-sued doctrine by making that Act the exclusive remedy
for tort actions against federal agencies. 228 For purposes of this exclusive remedy, the Federal Tort Claims Act defines "federal agency" as including "corpo229

rations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States."

The United States is generally not liable for attorney's fees in tort actions,
whether the fee award is sought under the Federal Tort Claims Act 230 or under
227. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982).
228. The Act states that:
The authority of any federal agency to sue and be sued in its own name shall not be
construed to authorize suits against such federal agency on claims which are cognizable
under section 1346(b) of this title and the remedies provided by this title in such cases shall
be exclusive.
Id. § 2679(a); see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 592 F.2d 364, 369-73
(7th Cir.) (Federal Tort Claims Act is exclusive remedy for tort action against agency and withdraws
sue-and-be-sued waiver of sovereign immunity over torts covered by the Act), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
829 (1979); Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Heller, 572 F.2d 174, 177 (8th Cir. 1978) (same). But see Woodbridge Plaza v. Bank of Irvine, 815 F.2d 538, 542-44 (9th Cir. 1987) (Federal Tort Claims Act is not
the exclusive remedy for tort actions outside the ambit of the Act; therefore, sue-and-be-sued clause
waives immunity for such torts).
229. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982); see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 877 F.2d
590, 591-92 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing, without deciding, whether the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation is a "federal agency" within the meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act when acting in
its capacity as a receiver of a bank rather than in its corporate capacity as an insurer of deposits).
See generallyJ. STEADMAN, D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACoBY, supra note 29, §§ 13.112.5, 13.116, at 26364, 268-71 (discussing tort liability of government corporations). The Federal Tort Claims Act cxpressly covers even the Postal Service, 39 U.S.C. § 409(c) (1982), although tort judgments arising
from Postal Service activities continue to be paid from Postal Service funds pursuant to the express
mandate of Subsection 409(e). With respect to government corporations, the suggestion has been
made from time to time that the Judgment Fund should not be available to pay tort awards against
such entities even when the lawsuit falls within the Federal Tort Claims Act because the corporation
was "primarily acting as [an] instrumentalit[y] or agenc[y] of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2671
(1982). The argument has been that tort judgments involving a government corporation should be
regarded as a business expense, especially because the corporation, unlike regular government agencies, could procure liability insurance. Thus, the impact on the corporation of paying the judgment
is correspondingly reduced and the United States Treasury should not be opened to pay the judgment. This is a sound policy argument, but since the Federal Tort Claims Act makes the United
States, and not the corporation, the true defendant under such circumstances, it is difficult to see
why the judgment is not properly payable from the Judgment Fund like other judgments against the
United States. But see Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 877 F.2d at 593 (suggesting
that judgments against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation when acting as a receiver are
payable as expenses out of the receivership estate rather than the Judgment Fund). When government corporations are not "primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States,"
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982), but instead are operating primarily as commercial business entities, the
Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply. Those corporations remain liable for tort claims pursuant
to their general sue-and-be-sued clause powers. In addition, the Tennessee Valley Authority is excepted from the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(0) (1982). The Tennessee Valley Authority's liability for tort action therefore stems from its status as a government
corporation and its sue-and-be-sued clause.
230. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides only that attorney's fees may be allowed up to a
maximum of 25 percent of the amount of damages recovered in the suit and makes no provision for
any shifting of fees to the government. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1982); see also Joe v. United States, 772
F.2d 1535, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("The FTCA does not contain the express waiver
of sovereign immunity necessary to permit a court to award attorneys' fees against the United States
directly under that act.").
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the EAJA. 23 1 Thus, fees usually cannot be granted against the federal government or its agencies and corporations, on an interim basis or otherwise, when

the action sounds in tort.
III. STANDARDS FOR INTERIM AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

If the fees are paid before the
battle's won,
The winner may pay the loser.
But ifthe fees are withheld until the
lawsuit's done,

The winner may become the loser.
Assuming the availability of interim attorney's fee awards against the federal government at least under some circumstances, the next inquiry concerns
the standards that should guide a district court's discretion to adjudge whether
an interim award is warranted in a particular case. 232 The rhyme set forth
above summarizes the real concerns underlying the interim fee question. First,
no fee award can be granted properly until "the battle's won," that is, until the
party to be awarded fees truly has prevailed on an important issue in the case so
that the party's ultimate entitlement to attorney's fees is free from any reasonable dispute. Second, interim fees should be awarded only "in cases of protracted litigation where a party's ability to obtain redress.., would be imperiled
without such an award."' 233 In other words, interim awards should be reserved
for those situations when, without an immediate award, the "winner may become the loser."
The basic presumption should be that interim fee awards are the exception
and are disfavored. In order to avoid repeated requests for new awards of fees at
each successive stage of litigation, the courts should make plain that ordinarily
231. Subsection 2412(d) of the EAJA expressly excepts "cases sounding in tort" from its feeshifting provision. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1987); see also Campbell v. United States,
835 F.2d 193, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1987) (tort actions were expressly excluded from the EAJA). Subsection (b), making the government liable for fees to the same extent as private parties, does not include
a similar exception. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Supp. V 1987). The marked dearth of statutory provisions
shifting fees in tort actions, and the interpretation of Subsection (b) to waive immunity from fee
awards only pursuant to federal law and federal statutes, Joe, 772 F.2d at 1537, indicates that the
federal government is liable for attorney's fees in a tort action only under the bad faith exception.
Because plaintiffs' attorneys generally handle tort cases on a contingency fee basis, Congress has not
seen a need for fee-shifting schemes in the tort area. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 25, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5003, 5014 (tort actions were excluded from EAJA because Congress believed the legal remedies available, such as contingency fee

arrangements, were adequate).
232. The standards outlined in this Article to guide a court's discretion in awarding interim
attorney's fees also may apply to requests for interim awards against private parties. But because an
award against the federal government usually constitutes a charge, directly or indirectly, against the
public Treasury, such a strict approach toward interim fees is especially important in the context of
suits against the government. Congress should consider these standards if it decides to expand the
availability of interim fee awards against the government by statutory enactment. If Congress decides to permit interim fee awards in additional contexts, it should make its intention clear in the
actual language of the fee-shifting statute and, when necessary, by amending the statutes governing
payment of awards from the Judgment Fund.
233. Yakowicz v. Pennsylvania, 683 F.2d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted).
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they will consider attorney's fees petitions only at the close of the litigation and
that they will grant petitions on an interlocutory basis only in extraordinary

circumstances.
In addition to the awkward piecemeal resolution of fee disputes that necessarily attends interim consideration of fee petitions, several other factors counsel

against frequent or routine grants of interim fees. First and foremost, if courts
prematurely assess attorney's fees, "the ultimately successful party might end up

having subsidized a large segment of the losing party's suit."'234 Courts can reduce this danger by careful adherence to the requirement that they award fees
only to a party that has prevailed on the merits of an important issue in the case.
Even then, the risk remains that the appellate court, or the trial court itself on
reconsideration, will reverse the interlocutory ruling on the merits and change

the ultimate outcome of the case.
A second, related reason to discourage interim fee applications is that a
petition for fees effectively asks a trial court to prejudge the merits of the case.
Fee applicants too frequently ask courts to conjecture prematurely about

whether the applicant will succeed ultimately in the litigation. It is often "too
difficult to determine in the flow of litigation, without an opportunity for retrospection" whether a party seeking fees truly has prevailed. 235 Moreover, a judge

who has awarded interim fees may, almost unconsciously, find it difficult subsequently to rule against the party on the remaining bones of contention in the
case, knowing that adverse rulings could cause the party to forfeit the tentative
status as a prevailing party. In that event, of course, any earlier interim fee
award would have to be disgorged. 236 A premature fee award therefore may
have the perverse effect of driving the underlying substantive litigation.
Finally, when ordered against the government, an interim fee award may

serve as a thinly disguised mechanism for evading the well-settled principle that
"[i]n the absence of express congressional consent to the award of interest separate from a general waiver of immunity to suit, the United States is immune
from an interest award. '23 7 Indeed, some courts that have permitted interim fee
awards against the United States have acknowledged forthrightly that a primary
motive for that action was to preserve the current value of the sum for the peti234. Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
235. Irons v. FBI, No. 82-1143-G (D. Mass. June 26, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
236. See Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1988) ("the government could
recover the interim fees it paid out ifit successfully appealed" the award); Palmer v. City of Chicago,
806 F.2d 1316, 1319 (7th Cir. 1986) ("we assume that the district court has an inherent power to
order attorneys to whom fees were paid over by their clients pursuant to court order to repay the fees
should the order be reversed"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987); 1 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra
note 1, § 9.03[2][d], at 9-46.2 (precedent holds or suggests that plaintiff awarded fees on an interlocutory basis may be forced to remit them if the defendant later prevails or the award is found to have
been erroneous); Green, supra note 3, at 270-71 (discussing concerns about recoupment of an interim
award of fees that is later overturned).
237. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314 (1986). For example, the courts consistently
have held that 28 U.S.C. § 196 1(a) (1982), which generally authorizes awards of interest on district
court civil judgments, is not a sufficiently unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity to permit the
recovery ofjudgment interest against the United States. See, e.g., Thompson v. Kennickell, 797 F.2d
1015, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 905 (1987); International Woodworkers of Am.,
Local 3-98 v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1986).
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tioning party and spare the litigant any losses due to delay. 2 3 8 Because Congress
has not seen fit to compensate uniformly those litigating against the government
"for the belated receipt of money,"' 2 3 9 it seems indefensible for courts to resort to
interim fee awards as a means of circumventing the no interest rule. 24° A litigant must show hardship greater than the loss of current value through delay in
payment before a court can properly grant an interim fee award against the
federal government.
When considering a request for an interim award, a court always retains the
discretion to postpone an award of attorney's fees until a later stage of the litiga-

tion or until after final judgment, even if the applicable statute mandates an
award of fees at the conclusion of the lawsuit.24 1 For the reasons stated, courts
should exercise that discretion regularly and apply strict standards for departure

from the general rule disfavoring interim fee awards. The burden of establishing
eligibility for and entitlement to an award of attorney's fees, at any stage, rests
squarely upon the fee applicant. 24 2 An applicant for an interim remedy also
bears the heavier burden of overcoming the negative presumption in a particular
case.
A.

Party Must Prevail on an Important Claim on the Merits

A threshold and absolute prerequisite to any successful petition for attorney's fees against the federal government, at any stage of litigation, must be that
the petitioner is truly a prevailing or substantially prevailing party. At a minimum, the party seeking fees must have established entitlement "to some relief on
the merits of his claims."' 243 Success on procedural, evidentiary, or most prelim-

inary matters, no matter how significant, is not sufficient to establish prevailing238. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Kennickell, 669 F. Supp. 529, 533 (D.D.C. 1987) ("Speedy decisions
on fee petitions and frequent grants of interim awards are necessary to minimize the loss in value of
the total award."); Jurgens v. EEOC, 660 F. Supp. 1097, 1099, 1103 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (citing the loss
of "non-recoverable interest" that will continue to occur if interim fees are not paid).
239. Shaw, 478 U.S. at 322.
240. The District of Columbia Circuit has prevented district courts from adjusting attorney's fee
awards upwards to compensate the attorney at a higher rate for work completed in earlier years,
saying such an adjustment is "simply a forbidden award of interest under another name." Save Our
Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds,
857 F.2d 1516, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 848
F.2d. 1265, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (enhancing attorney's fee award under the FOIA for delay in
receipt of payment was equivalent to an interest award and as such was precluded under Shaw). But
see Wilket v. ICC, 844 F.2d 867, 876-77 (D.C. Cir.) (under the EAJA provision allowing enhancement of a fee when a "special factor" is present, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1987), "unusual
delay" between the time the legal work is performed and the time award is made justified a higher
fee), reh'gen banc denied, 857 F.2d 793, 794, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Starr, J., dissenting; Edwards, J.,
concurring).
241. 1 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 1, § 9.03[2][a], at 9-32.
242. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
243. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980) (per curiam). What constitutes a sufficiently clear case of success on the merits to warrant an interim attorney's fee award is beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally 1 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 1, § 9.03, at 9-26 to 946.2 (discussing what type of litigative success qualifies a litigant for an interim award of attorney's
fees); E. LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATrORNEY'S FEES 244-49 (1981) (same); H.
NEWBERG, ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS § 3.05, at 112-13 (1986 & Supp. 1989) (same).
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party status. 244 There must have been some final determination of "the substantial rights of the parties" 24 5 such that the plaintiff can "point to a resolution of
the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the
24 6
defendant."
For example, if an interim award is otherwise warranted, a court might
properly consider a petition for interim fees when the liability of the federal
government has been established definitively and all that remains to be adjudicated is the appropriate relief.247 Likewise, an interim fee award may be warranted when a court has entered partial summary judgment against the
government on a discrete and important claim in the case. 248
In Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent School District,24 9 the Supreme Court rejected a test for prevailing party status under 42
U.S.C. § 1988250 that required a party to have prevailed on the "central issue"
in the litigation and not merely upon significant secondary issues. 25 1 The Court
instead adopted a general rule that, to be a prevailing party under fee-shifting
statutes, a litigant need only have succeeded on " 'any significant issue in [the]
litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the
suit.' "252
Although one could argue for a stricter central issue test when a litigant
seeks the extraordinary remedy of interim fees, at least in suits against the government, such a general rule would be very difficult to reconcile with the
Supreme Court's decision. First, although the Texas State TeachersAssociation
case dealt with a fee award made after completion of the litigation, the Court
relied heavily upon its prior decision in Hanrahan v. Hampton,25 3 which indicated an interim fee award was proper when a party had prevailed only on a
"significant" rather than a "central" issue. 254 Second, although a stricter standard arguably should apply to awards against the government under traditional
principles of sovereign immunity, the Texas State Teachers Association Court
strongly criticized the central issue standard as an unworkable test "focusing on
the subjective importance of an issue to the
litigants" and thereby turning
'255
"largely on the mental state of the parties."
244. Hanrahan,446 U.S. at 758-59. For discussion of the rule against fee awards for prevailing
on procedural matters, see I M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 1, § 9.03[2J[b], at 9-33 to 9-38.
For discussion of the rule against fee awards for prevailing on most preliminary relief issues, see id.
§ 9.03[2][c], at 9-38 to 9-46.2.
245. Hanrahan,446 U.S. at 758.
246. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1493 (1989).
247. For an example of the award of interim fees when the litigation has proceeded through the

liability stage, see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Corp., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970).
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
Hensley
253.
254.
255.

1 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 1, § 9.03[2][a], at 9-30.
109 S.Ct. 1486 (1989).
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
Texas State Teachers Ass'n, 109 S.Ct. at 1491-94.
Id. at 1491 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)); see also
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (same).
446 U.S. 754 (1980).
Texas State Teachers Ass'n, 109 S.Ct. at 1492 (citing Hanrahan, 446 U.S. at 757).
Id. at 1492-93.
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However, although the Court made clear that it was enunciating a general
prevailing party rule for fee-shifting statutes, whether made on an interim basis
or otherwise, 256 particular statutory contexts may require exceptions to the general Texas State Teachers Association standard. For example, the legislative history of the EAJA expressly provides that an interim award "may . . . be
appropriate where the party has prevailed on an interim issue which was central
to the case."' 257 Moreover, fees are available under the EAJA only when the
government's position in the litigation is not substantially justified, 258 a standard
which requires the court to evaluate the reasonableness of the government's litigating position in the context of the case as a whole, 259 an inquiry that could not
proceed before the court resolves the heart of the case. 260 Even though the

Supreme Court has found the central issue standard to be unwieldy, it nevertheless is the standard Congress has mandated for interim fee awards under the
EAJA. Similarly, even if interim fees were available under the FOIA, 261that

statute's attorney's fees provision allows fees only to parties who have "substan-

tially prevailed" in the "case."' 262 Thus, this provision, by its very terms, contemplates that the courts should evaluate the significance of partial success in
263
terms of the overall objectives of the litigation.
The distinction between prevailing on a "central" issue or a "significant"
issue often may be largely a semantical debate and should not obscure the underlying basis for a strict standard of success, however articulated, before an interim
award against the government is appropriate. The question is less whether a
party has prevailed on some issue than whether the party's entitlement to fees is
sufficiently clear at an interlocutory stage to justify an early award of fees. The
objective is to ensure that fees are not awarded prematurely when there remains
substantial doubt as to the party's ultimate entitlement to fees. The court should
256. Id. at 1489, 1492.
257. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1434,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5003, 5011 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4984, 4990 (emphasis added); see also Haitian
Refugee Center v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir.) (interim award of attorney's fees under
Equal Access to Justice Act permitted when party has prevailed on central or main issue in case), as
modified on reh'g, 804 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1986).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
259. Battles Farm Co. v. Pierce, 806 F.2d 1098, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Under the EAJA, the
focus of a court's analysis must be on the justification of the government's overalllitigating position."
(emphasis added)), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 2890 (1988).
260. The substantial justification standard is not actually part of the test for determining whether
a litigant is a prevailing party for EAJA purposes. It is an additional requirement, however, that
must be satisfied before a prevailing party is entitled to fees under EAJA Subsection 2412(d). Because the substantial justification of the government's position must be assessed on the basis of its
overall litigating position, it would be premature to engage in that inquiry before a litigant had
prevailed on the central matter at issue. Not until the central part of the case had been adjudicated
would the government's overall position on the merits of the case have been presented and
considered.
261. But see supra notes 71-127 and accompanying text (explaining that interim fee awards are
not available under the FOIA).
262. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982).
263. See Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (the governing statutory standard for fees in FOIA cases is whether the plaintiff has "substantially prevailed
as to his overall request"); see also supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing how substantially prevailing status is determined under the FOIA).
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resolve any doubts about whether a party has achieved sufficient relief on the
merits to qualify as a prevailing party by denying any interim award and waiting
until the litigation has reached a more mature stage. Likewise, if the court
found the merits of the underlying claims close so that there is a fair prospect of

reversal on appeal, the court properly may regard the litigant's prevailing party
status as tentative and uncertain. Under such circumstances, the court should be
reluctant to order any immediate payment of fees. 2 64 Again, the presumption
remains that interim awards are disfavored.
B. Interim Award Must be Necessary to Alleviate SubstantialHardship

The only legitimate circumstance in which to charge the federal government with an award of attorney's fees prior to the completion of litigation is

when "delay[ing] a fee award until the entire litigation is concluded would work
substantial hardship on plaintiffs and their counsel."' 265 In the context of private

parties, courts have granted awards of fees on an interlocutory basis much more
readily when the petitioning party is experiencing

"extreme cash-flow

problems"2 66 due to the protracted nature of the litigation and the "disparity

between the petitioner's and the defendants' resources."'2 67 The courts understandably have been troubled by any prospect that a wealthier defendant may
2 68
secure "victory through an economic war of attrition against the plaintiffs."

When courts have stretched statutory provisions to imply an interim fee
remedy against the United States-wrongly in this author's view 269-they

gen-

erally have recognized that such a remedy can be justified only when it is necessary "to enable meritorious litigation to continue.

' 270

Therefore, these courts

264. For these same reasons, ifa court makes an interim award, it should limit the award to the
minimum amount to which the fee applicant clearly is entitled. Substantial disputes concerning the
proper hourly rate, the reasonable number of hours expended, enhancements for taking the case on
contingency, upward adjustments for the quality of the work or results obtained, etc., should be
postponed for resolution at the conclusion of the litigation. These issues are not appropriately addressed at any interlocutory stage. After all, an interim award of fees is best regarded as a stop-gap
measure when there is a compelling need for an early award.
265. See Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 723 (1974). In Bradley, the Supreme
Court cited the "substantial hardship" factor as a justification for interim fee awards, but did not
state expressly that a finding of such hardship was a necessary precondition for granting such
awards. In the context of the federal government, however, to justify charging the fee award against
the sovereign and the public Treasury, a showing of hardship should be a requirement, not merely a
consideration.
266. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
267. 1 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 1, § 9.03[2][a], at 9-23.
268. James, 559 F.2d at 359 (footnote omitted).
269. See supra notes 14-131 and accompanying text.
270. Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 725 (9th Cir. 1988) (failure to permit interim fee
awards would be to "countenance the government's dragging its heels, thereby forcing impecunious
litigants to abandon their quest"); Powell v. Department of Justice, 569 F. Supp. 1192, 1199 (N.D.
Cal. 1983) ("Without an award of interim fees, many plaintiffs without the financial wherewithal to
engage in such protracted litigation would be forced to abandon their FOIA lawsuits in midstream."); Biberman v. FBI, 496 F. Supp. 263, 264-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("Experience teaches that
cases arise in which the protracted nature of the litigation is such that, without the support of an
interim award of attorneys fees, a plaintiff's meritorious claim might have to be dropped."). In cases
between private parties, the courts also have held that interim fee awards are appropriate "in cases of
protracted litigation where a party's ability to obtain redress ...would be imperiled without such an
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have permitted an interim fee award only when the plaintiff has shown that he
"cannot otherwise afford to continue litigating" the lawsuit.2 71 This argument

can bear only so much weight. Trial judges have an arsenal of weapons at their
disposal by which they can manage litigation so that one party cannot take advantage of another through unjustified and unreasonable delay 272 Only if such

means fail or the lawsuit is unavoidably complex and lengthy in nature should a
judge consider resorting to interim awards of fees to provide the immediate infusion of cash necessary for a party to continue the litigation.
One district court has articulated four guidelines for determining whether
sufficient indicia of hardship are present in a case to warrant an interim fee
2 73
award against the government. This court in Powell v. Department of Justice
stated the guidelines as follows:
First, the court should consider the degree of hardship which delaying
a fee award until the litigation is finally concluded would work on
plaintiff and his or her counsel....
Second, the court should consider whether there is unreasonable delay
on the government's part. When delay is present, an award of interim
fees would serve the Congress' aim to discourage the use of illegitimate
tactics.
Third, the court should consider the length of time the case has been
pending prior to the motion, and
Fourth, [the court should consider] the period
of time likely to be re274
quired before the litigation is concluded.
The most important of these factors is the degree of hardship upon a party
and counsel that would follow denial of an interim award. This standard requires some concrete showing of financial distress in order to justify an award of
fees. 275 A party and the party's counsel need not demonstrate that they are on
award." Yakowicz v. Pennsylvania, 683 F.2d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Walters v. City of
Atlanta, 652 F. Supp. 755, 761 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (citing a party's inability to continue to litigate
without an interim award as a relevant factor), rey'd in part, 803 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1986).
271. Powell, 569 F. Supp. at 1199.
272. Most importantly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 confers broad authority on district
judges to issue scheduling orders to set deadlines for completion of certain steps in the litigation and
to hold pretrial conferences to simplify the issues, clarify factual disputes, and generally establish
"early and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of management." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(2). See generally 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 1521-30 (1971 & Supp. 1988) (discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 16).
273. 569 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
274. Id. at 1200. Unfortunately, while the Powell court spelled out a thoughtful and careful
approach to guide interim fee determinations, it is not clear that this court has given teeth to this
approach in practice. In both Powell and the same court's subsequent order in Rosenfeld v. Department of Justice, Nos. C-85-2247 MHP & C-85-1709 MHP, slip op. at 6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 1987),
appeal dismissed and mandamus denied, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988), the court accepted largely
conclusory pleas of hardship by plaintiffs' counsel without any concrete showing of actual financial
dislocation that would have prevented plaintiffs' counsel from continuing to pursue the claim vigorously. Indeed, in the Rosenfeld case, although payment of the interim award was delayed for more
than a year while an appeal was pending, plaintiff's counsel completed briefing and argument of the
case before the district court. Opposition of Appellants/Petitioners to Application of Appellees/
Real Party in Interest for Interim Award of Attorney's Fees on Appeal at 12-14, 17, Rosenfeld v.
United States, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2975). The plaintiff's contention that the litigation could not be continued absent an immediate award was thus belied-by subsequent events.
275. Presumably, the government would be entitled to at least some minimal discovery concern-
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the verge of bankruptcy or that continuing the litigation without an award will
pauperize them. However, the party and the party's counsel must adduce some
specific evidence, beyond conclusory allegations of hardship, demonstrating that
they cannot reasonably prosecute the litigation without sacrificing financial stability. A fee applicant could make this showing with evidence of heavy indebtedness, expenses that would go unmet, or significant depletion of individual or
law firm resources in order to bankroll the litigation.
The other factors in the Powell test focus upon the protracted nature of the
litigation and assessment of blame, if any, for the extended length of the proceedings. A party should not be able to assert financial hardship in a case of
ordinary complexity that has proceeded at a routine pace. Nor can a party
demonstrate need for an interim award when the litigation is nearly complete
and a fee petition fairly could be postponed until after an imminent final judgment. A court should not consider a party's financial hardship as anything

other than the normal and expected incident of ordinary litigation unless the
litigation has been unduly protracted and is likely to continue for a substantial
276
period of time.
Although no interim award should be permitted when the litigation has not
been protracted, the length of proceedings alone is not conclusive. The fee applicant also must demonstrate concrete financial distress that is attributable to the
unusual length of the litigation. In other words, the protracted nature of litigation is a necessary, but not sufficient, prerequisite for an interim award of fees
against the government.
Finally, there is the question of culpability for the protracted nature of the
proceedings. When the litigation has been ongoing for a substantial length of
time and the party and counsel have established significant financial hardship,
the fact that the government has not engaged in any egregious delay should not
prevent an award of fees when necessary for the plaintiff to continue the litigation. If, on the other hand, the government has engaged in dilatory conduct that
has added greatly to the length of the litigation, an interim award of fees may be
warranted in what would otherwise be a close case on the question of hardship.
Courts should be careful, however, not to deny the government its right to defend itself vigorously in good faith. If the government has conducted a legitimate and active defense, its actions should never be accounted as egregious or
277
bad faith behavior justifying the award of interim fees.
ing the claims of financial hardship alleged by the party and counsel. Although the district court
should prevent such discovery from becoming overly intrusive, the government should be permitted
sufficient latitude to investigate reasonably the party and counsel's financial stability and resources
for continued litigation.
276. One court has suggested that the protracted nature of litigation is the "controlling factor"
in considering whether to award interim fees. Hameed v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural,
and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 523 (8th Cir. 1980). Other courts have
recognized the importance of this factor in adjudging interim fee requests, See, e.g., Carpenter v.
Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 633 (5th Cir. 1983); James v. Stockham Valves &
Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 358 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Walters v. City of
Atlanta, 652 F. Supp. 755, 761 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
277. Because interim fees for litigation work are at issue here, allegedly obdurate conduct by the
government prior to the filing of the lawsuit is not relevant and should not be considered. The court
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The court also must consider the delays in the litigation that are attributable to the conduct of the party seeking an award of fees. If the fee applicant has
lengthened the litigation by unnecessarily multiplying the claims made and the
pleadings filed, by obtaining extensions of time for filing litigation papers, or by
otherwise litigating in an unduly time-consuming manner, the court should deny
an interim award. No party can legitimately assert hardship in litigation that
has become protracted because of that party's own conduct.
C. Security for Recoupment of Interim Awards
If an interim award is entered against the federal government, the court is
obligated to protect the government's right to recoup those fees if the court's
order later is overturned in whole or in part. 278 In most cases, "the simple device of requiring the party recovering interim fees to post a bond guaranteeing
279
repayment in the event of reversal" should suffice to provide such protection.
If for some reason, however, the posting of a bond is not feasible, the court
either should decline to grant the interim award or take all appropriate actions
to facilitate an immediate appeal of the award. The district court could certify
the interim fee ruling for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 280 or Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b). 281 At the very least, the district court could draft the
interim fee order to enhance the prospects that an interlocutory appeal would be
28 2
accepted by the court of appeals under exceptions to the final judgment rule.
In the event of an appeal, the government is entitled to an automatic stay of the
interim fee order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(e).
D. Appealability of Interim Fee Awards Against the Government
Interim attorney's fee awards are not usually appealable under any of the
exceptions to the general rule that appellate review must wait until after the trial
court has entered a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.283
should consider only whether the government's conduct of the litigation since its commencement has
resulted in unreasonable delay.
278. On recoupment of and security for interim fee awards, see generally 1 M. DERFNER & A.
WOLF, supra note 1, § 9.03[23[d], at 9-46.2 to 9-48.
279. Green, supra note 3, at 271 (footnote omitted); see also Feher v. Department of Labor &
Indus. Relations, 561 F. Supp. 757, 768 (D. Haw. 1983) (requiring posting of bond to ensure recovery of interim fee award if later overturned); Howard v. Phelps, 443 F. Supp. 374, 377 (E.D. La.
1978) (same); Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 445 F. Supp. 559, 560 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (same); 1 M.
DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 1, § 9.03[2][d], at 9-47 ("In statutory fee cases .... the courts have
frequently conditioned the award of interim fees on the recipient's posting of security adequate to
assure repayment should the award be reduced or reversed.").

280. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
281. On certification of interim awards for appeal, see generally 2 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF,
supra note 1, § 18.07[2][c], at 18-78. Some courts, however, have suggested that attorney's fee issues
may not be certified under Rule 54(b), which they believe is directed only toward determination of
the parties' claims on the merits. Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160, 164 n.7 (2d Cir. 1980); Swanson v.
American Consumer Indus. Inc., 517 F.2d 555, 560-61 (7th Cir. 1975). But see 2 M. DERFNER &A.
WOLF, supra note 1, § 18.07[2][c], at 18-78 ("There is no reason why fee determinations should be
treated differently under Rule 54(b).").
282. See infra notes 283-310 and accompanying text.

283. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982); see, e.g., Thompson v. Potashnick Constr. Co., 812 F.2d 574, 576
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Most attempts to appeal interim fee awards have been made pursuant to the
"collateral order doctrine" of Cohen v. BeneficialIndustrialLoan Corp.28 4 This

rule permits an interlocutory appeal of a "small class" of orders that "finally
determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent from the cause

itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated." 28 5 To fall within this collateral order exception, the order sought
to be appealed must "[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and
'286
[3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
Although the Supreme Court has stated that attorney's fees issues are col-

lateral and separate from the merits of the action, 287 it may be difficult in many
(9th Cir. 1987) (interim fee award is not appealable); Baskin v. Hawley, 810 F.2d 370, 372 (2d Cir.
1987) (same); Hastings v. Maine-Endwell Cent. School Dist., 676 F.2d 893, 895-96 (2d Cir. 1982)
(same); Bradford Exch. v. Trein's Exch., 644 F.2d 682, 682 (7th Cir. 1981) (same); Ruiz v. Estelle,
609 F.2d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). But see, e.g., Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1035
(6th Cir. 1988) (allowing appeal of an interim fee award); Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316,
1320 (7th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987). On appealability of interim fee
determinations, see 2 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 1, § 18.07[2][c], at 18-75 to 18-78, and
Green, supra note 3, at 268-273.
The question whether a party may appeal a particular interim attorney's fee award is distinct
from the question whether the federal government may seek immediate appellate review of the district court's jurisdictional authority to enter such an order requiring the government to pay an interim award. See supra note 98 (discussing appealability of interim fee award in Rosenfeld v. United
States, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988)). If a court of appeals is unwilling to accept jurisdiction over
such an appeal, it could leave the federal government in the anomalous situation of unlawfully being
compelled to violate an express statutory prohibition on payment of a nonfinal award without any
avenue of appellate relief. If the Judgment Fund finality requirement is at issue, the immediate
payment itself would constitute an irreparable harm to the sovereign immunity of the United States;
therefore, the denial of interlocutory appellate review would effectively deny the government any
right to meaningful review. The vital question whether interim awards are available against the
federal government under certain statutory schemes would be insulated forever from appellate review. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977) (immediate appeal is allowed when the
order concerns "an important right which would be 'lost, probably irreparably,' if review had to
await final judgment") (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949)); see also Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1494, 1498 (1989) (same), Even
the Ninth Circuit, which otherwise disagreed with the government's position in Rosenfeld v. United
States, recognized the importance of this issue and exercised supervisory mandamus jurisdiction to
address the government's challenge to an interim fee award as unauthorized. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at
722-23.
284. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
285. Id. at 546; see also 2 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 1, § 18.07[2][c], at 18-76 (the
Cohen collateral order "doctrine permits courts of appeals to treat as 'final' certain collateral orders
so that appellate review may be had immediately, without awaiting a final judgment for the entire
case").
286. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (citations omitted).
287. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 108 S. Ct. 1717, 1720-21 (1988); White v. New
Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1982); see also Haitian Refugee Center
v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489, 1494 (11th Cir.) (interim fee award is collateral for purposes of Cohen
rule), as modified on reh'g, 804 F.2d 1573 (1lth Cir. 1986). In Rosenfeld, the Ninth Circuit suggested that an interim award was not collateral to the merits because the purpose of the award was to
enable the litigation to continue, and an appeal of the award "by freezing the progress of the ongoing
litigation, thwarts that purpose." Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 721. This reasoning is circular because one
can anticipate that the ongoing litigation will be frozen only if one first assumes that the challenged
interim award was necessary because the fee applicant indeed was suffering serious financial hardship-that is, if one assumes the merits of the appeal. Moreover, this reasoning treats a factor tangential to the legal issues in the case-the existence of resources to fund litigation-as relevant to the
question whether an order falls within the collateral order doctrine. Every interlocutory appeal, no
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cases to argue that an interim award constitutes a conclusive. ruling, because the
288
court presumably intends to consider fee issues again as the case progresses,
or that objections to the fee award cannot be raised effectively upon a subsequent
appeal. Cohen does not lay down a rigid test, however; each prong of the test
applies in light of the general purposes of the final judgment rule. In this regard,
the Supreme Court has observed that "in deciding the question of finality the
most important competing considerations are 'the inconvenience and costs of
piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on
the other.' ",289 It is also quite significant that "an early case permitting appeal
from an order awarding [attorney's] fees before conclusion of the underlying
290
litigation was a precursor of the Cohen collateral order doctrine."
Even when courts have ordered interim fee awards against parties other
than the federal government-situations in which the public interest in protecting public assets is not implicated-the courts of appeals have begun to break
down the absolute bar against immediate appeal of such awards. In Palmer v.
City of Chicago,29 1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that an interim award should be subject to immediate appeal under the
collateral order doctrine when the party required to pay the award was unlikely
to be able to recover the money if the award were later overturned on appeal
after the litigation was concluded. 292 The denial of an immediate avenue of
appellate review effectively would have left the party without any recourse to
293
challenge the award.
matter how collateral, will have some practical, if incidental, effect upon the district court proceedings, if only because the litigants must devote time and attention to the appeal. For purposes of the
second prong of the collateral order doctrine, however, the crucial question is whether, as a matter of
law, the issues on appeal are separate from and collateral to the merits of the case.
288. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 721; Hastings v. Maine-Endwell Cent. School Dist., 676 F.2d 893,
896 (2d Cir. 1982). Interim fee awards, by their very nature, usually are not intended as the final
disposition of all attorney's fees matters in the case. The district court always retains the authority
to modify that award, although it will presumably be modified upward, not downward. Green, supra
note 3, at 272 n.350. However, the award is conclusive as an interim fee award; it definitively estab-

lishes liability to pay fees on an interim basis. See id. (when an interim award is granted, "the right
to fees and the amount awarded to that point ha[s] been fixed and [is] not likely to be adjusted").
That should be sufficient for purposes of the collateral order doctrine. Particularly when the court
contemplates immediate payment of the award, as is usually the case, the term "interim order" is a
"misnomer"; the immediate duty to pay the award is not tentative or uncertain. Palmer v. City of
Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987).
289. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964) (quoting Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)).
290. Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160, 164 n.7 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Trustees v. Greenough, 105
U.S. 527, 531 (1882)); see also Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 555, 560 (7th
Cir. 1975) (same).
291. 806 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987).
292. Id. at 1320; see also Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 721-22 (interim award is appealable under collateral order doctrine only when "the government bears the burden of showing that ultimately it
could not obtain repayment").
293. Palmer, 806 F.2d at 1319-20; see also Green, supra note 3, at 270-72 (Cohen collateral order
doctrine should permit appeal of interim attorney's fee award where recoupment is uncertain). A
similar doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.)
201 (1848), permits immediate appeal of orders that "direct immediate execution of judgment or
delivery of property to an opposing party in circumstances that threaten irreparable harm." 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3910, at 457 (1976).
In Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1327 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1981), the
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For similar reasons, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Webster v. Sowders294 also accepted an interlocutory appeal of an interim
fee award. The court held that a "combination of features," consisting of "the
weight of the prospective burden" of the district court's order requiring future
payment of monthly fees for an indeterminate period and "the likelihood of irreparable harm due to nonrecovery" of the fees, made the award appealable as a
295
collateral order.
As the Sixth Circuit ruled in Webster, the courts of appeals also have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) 296 to review district courts' interlocutory
orders granting or denying injunctions. Although other courts have rejected this
basis for appeal of interim awards, 29 7 it may be possible to view those interim fee
orders that affirmatively command immediate payment as tantamount to injunctions. 298 Leading commentators on civil procedure have suggested that interlocutory orders directing the immediate payment of money should be immediately
appealable under Section 1292(a)(1). 29 9 Thus, when a district court orders immediate payment of an interim fee award, on penalty of contempt, a party
should have recourse to an immediate appeal, at least when the party can
demonstrate that it would otherwise suffer serious or irreparable harm. Any
uncertainty about whether the fees paid could later be recouped certainly would
constitute a showing of irreparable harm meriting an interlocutory appeal under
this injunction theory.
If courts adhere to the standards outlined earlier 300 for interim awards of
fees against the government, the government would invariably be entitled to an
interlocutory appeal, at least in the absence of security to guarantee recoupment.
Because a party should have to establish substantial financial hardship to qualify
for such an award, courts should presume that the party would be unable to
refund the fees if an appellate court later overturns the award. When a court
grants an interim award for the purpose of allowing the party to continue the
litigation, the court must expect that the litigant will draw on the payment immediately and the money therefore will be unavailable for prompt repayment
later.
Fifth Circuit permitted an interlocutory appeal under the Forgay-Conradrule when a district court
had directed immediate payment of attorney's fees out of settlement proceeds. See also Green, supra
note 3, at 272-73 (Forgay-Conradrule "appear[s] applicable to an interim fee award [if] recoupment
is in doubt").
294. 846 F.2d 1032 (6th Cir. 1988).
295. Id. at 1035 (citing Palmer, 806 F.2d at 1319).
296. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982).
297. Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 722 (9th Cir. 1988); Hastings v. Maine-Endwell
Cent. School Dist., 676 F.2d 893, 896 (2d Cir. 1982).
298. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981) (an order that has the "practical effect" of granting or denying an injunction is subject to interlocutory appeal if the order will
have a "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence").
299. 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3922,

at 46 (1977); see also Robbins v. McNicholas Transp. Co., 819 F.2d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 1987) ("order
compelling payment of interim liability" had "consequences similar to an injunction" and therefore
was subject to interlocutory appeal if irreparable harm was established).
300. See supra notes 243-77 and accompanying text.

1989]

INTERIM ATTORNEY'S FEES

The Seventh Circuit in Palmer30 1 and the Ninth Circuit in Rosenfeld v.
United States30 2 stated that district courts could alleviate concerns about recoupment of interim fees if they ordered payment of the fees directly to the
lawyers rather than the parties. It is far from clear, however, that a court has
the authority to order payment to a nonparty; counsel's interest in attorney's
fees is entirely derivative of the litigant's. 30 3 And, even if fees are paid directly
to the attorneys, doubts about recoupment may persist. 3° 4 Under the standards

set forth earlier to govern interim awards against the government, the hardship
that a party must show applies equally to counsel. Moreover, simply because
the money will go into the lawyer's pocket hardly removes the danger that "the

305
fees [will] disappear into insolvent hands.
Finally, although the Ninth Circuit in Rosenfeld 30 6 held the government to
a strict standard for interlocutory appeals from interim fee awards, 30 7 another
court of appeals has reached a contrary conclusion. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Haitian Refugee Center v. Meese 308 held
that an interim award of attorney's fees against the federal government under
the EAJA 30 9 was appealable under the Cohen collateral order rule. 3 10 The
court's ruling did not turn upon, nor did the court consider, whether the interim
fee could be recovered if appellate review was delayed. The Eleventh Circuit's
decision may set the stage for an approach that grants more generous appellate
rights to the government when challenging an order that constitutes a charge
against public funds.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Because of the United States' traditional immunity from having to pay
monetary awards prior to appellate review, courts properly have been reluctant
to entertain petitions for interim attorney's fees against the federal government.
However, the recent trickle of decisions granting such interlocutory awards
against the government seems bound to grow. In particular, the Ninth Circuit's
301.

806 F.2d 1316, 1319 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987).

302. 859 F.2d 717, 721 (9th Cir. 1988).
303. See, e.g., Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-32 (1986) (fee-shifting statute bestows eligibility for fee awards on the party, not on the attorney, and the party may waive eligibility for fees as
part of a settlement of the case); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 722 F.2d 1009, 1011 (2d Cir. 1983)
(under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), "it is the prevailing party rather than the lawyer who is entitled to

attorney's fees"); Oguachuba v. INS, 706 F.2d 93, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1983) (same rule under EAJA);
Smith v. South Side Loan Co., 567 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1978) ("an award [of attorney's fees] is
the right of the party suing not the attorney representing him").

304. In Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1035 (6th Cir. 1988), the court found the possibility
of irreparable injury justified an interlocutory appeal when there were no "assurances that in the
event of appellate reversal on the merits the State could recover [the interim fee award] from plaintiffs' counsel."
305. See Palmer, 806 F.2d at 1319.
306. 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988).
307. Id. at 719-22.
308. 791 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir.), as modified on reh'g, 804 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1986).
309. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
310. Haitian Refugee Center, 791 F.2d at 1493-94.
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expansive reading of a fee-shifting statute in Rosenfeld v. United States3 1 -- especially the court's willingness to leap over the finality requirement in the Judgment Fund statutes 3 12 -undoubtedly will encourage other courts to improvise
inthis area.
As with any movement to break down the barriers of federal sovereign immunity, however, the courts should defer the lead to Congress. Unless the statutory language or the legislative history of a particular fee-shifting statute
provides direct evidence that Congress contemplated interim fee awards against
the government, courts should long hesitate before implying such an exceptional
remedy against the sovereign. 31 3 Certain fee-shifting statutes, such as the Equal

Access to Justice Act, 3 14 will be susceptible to such an interpretation. Others,
including those for which awards are payable from the Judgment Fund, will not
admit such an approach. 3 15 Courts should adhere faithfully to the longstanding
principle that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be construed strictly and
narrowly in favor of the government. 31 6 Courts should also heed the Supreme
Court's admonition that they be careful " 'to observe the conditions defined by
Congress for charging the public treasury.' ",317
In the end, litigants doing battle with the government may be able to obtain
necessary interim relief under an approach that also protects the public interest
in preventing premature raids upon the public Treasury. This Article has attempted to plot a course that responds to these conflicting concerns by allowing
for interim fee awards when necessary but also establishing strict safeguards. 3 18
If and when Congress again turns its attention to this area, it should prescribe
clear statutory rules and standards to guide courts when they consider whether
to grant interim relief in the form of attorney's fees. 3 19 Until then, the watchword of the courts should be caution.

311. 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988).
312. 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (1982); 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982).
313. In Letelier v. Department of Justice, 1 Gov't Disclosure Serv. (P-H) 9 80,252 (D.D.C. Oct.
2, 1980), the court denied a petition for an interim fee award under the Freedom of Information Act,
stating:
[iln
light of the absence of any clear direction from Congress, the lack of case support
for an award of interim fees, and the practical difficulties which a rule allowing such fees
would engender, the court feels constrained not "to fashion drastic new rules with respect
to the allowance of attorneys' fees."
Id. (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975)). Other courts

should follow this lead.
314. See supra notes 139-64 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 14-131 and accompanying text.
316. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463
U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983).

317. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981) (quoting Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill,
332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947)).
318. See supra notes 232-310 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 232 (introducing standards Congress should consider when amending feeshifting statutes to allow interim awards).

